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THE RISE OF THE END USER IN  
PATENT LITIGATION 
GAIA BERNSTEIN∗ 
Abstract: The patent system focuses on the actions of two players: the patentee and 
its competitor. It assumes that the competitor will represent the interests of the end 
user. But, end users are increasingly becoming significant players in the patent sys-
tem, with their interests sometimes diverging from those of competitors. Attention 
has recently turned to Patent Assertion Entities (“PAEs”)—also known as patent 
trolls—who are suing vast numbers of customers using patented technologies in 
their everyday businesses. Yet, end users were also principal players in some of the 
main recent patent cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. In Bowman v. Monsanto 
Co., Monsanto sued farmers for re-using its patented self-replicating seeds. In As-
sociation for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, patients and physicians 
sued to invalidate breast cancer gene patents. And, patients and drug stores repeat-
edly challenge pay-for-delay agreements between patentees and competitors, 
claiming they undermine patients’ interests in access to generic drugs.  
 The drafters of the America Invents Act (the “AIA”) intended the legislation to 
catch up with the changing patent landscape. Yet, the AIA did not predict and is 
largely ill-equipped to address the growing role of end users. The AIA addresses 
the needs of small entities, mainly, by adding procedures to challenge patents in the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), providing a cheaper and faster 
forum for challenging validity. However, end users are different from small techno-
logical competitors. End users lack technological sophistication, they are often one-
time players and tend to become involved in the patent dispute relatively late in the 
life of the patent. The AIA’s novel PTO procedures are largely unsuitable for end 
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users because they permit expansive challenges mostly early in the life of the pa-
tent before end users are likely to be implicated. 
 Paradoxically, as end users play an increasingly larger role in patent law dis-
putes, they have few legal tools to assert their interests. This Article argues for the 
need to equip end users with tools to defend their interests in this new patent litiga-
tion landscape. Specifically, since end users, who lack internal resources of techno-
logical sophistication, are especially ill suited to fund the expense of patent litiga-
tion, fee shifting is particularly warranted when the prevailing party is an end user. 
In 2014, the Supreme Court Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness, in which it 
lowered the standard courts need apply to award fee shifting in patent cases. And, 
at the same time, a flurry of Congressional bills proposes different versions of fee 
shifting. Yet, while these cases and bills address the general fee shifting standard 
and the issue of PAE lawsuits, they do not consider the unique status end users. 
This Article argues for the need to consider the special status of end users in any 
fee shifting reform. 
INTRODUCTION 
The landscape of patent litigation is changing. While two players tradi-
tionally dominated patent litigation—the patent owner and the competitor—
end users are occupying a growing role. The media, legislators, and commenta-
tors have recently started paying attention to Patent Assertion Entities 
(“PAEs”), also known as “patent trolls,” and their lawsuits against customers.1 
PAEs, who primarily own software patents,2 are threatening to sue and are su-
ing thousands of customers, who use the allegedly patented technology they 
purchase from manufacturers and suppliers.3 For example, in January 2013, 
Personal Audio, LLC, a PAE, began sending demand letters for licensing fees 
and suing podcasters, including comedian Adam Carrolla, claiming it owns a 
patent over podcasting technology and that these individual podcasters in-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally, e.g., Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) 
Act, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013) (providing for fee shifting to the prevailing party if the losing party 
is a PAE); Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law’s Customer Suit Exception, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 1605 (2013) (proposing expanding the customer suit exception as a solution to PAEs’ 
lawsuits against customers); Ashby Jones, Cisco Calls Patent Trolls Racketeers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
11, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324073504578113082258844080, 
archived at http://perma.cc/RLD2-VTAN?type=pdf (describing a PAE’s lawsuits and threats against 
Cisco’s customers); Colleen V. Chien & Edward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being Sued 
en Masse for Patent Infringement & What Can Be Done (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of L. Legal Studies 
Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 20-13, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318666, archived at http://perma.cc/QPZ4-87GT (analyzing PAEs’ lawsuits 
against customers). 
 2 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REG., Winter 2011–12, at 
26, 28 (stating that PAEs are particularly common in the software industry). 
 3 Chien & Reines, supra note 1, at 8–11 (discussing PAE lawsuits against numerous customers). 
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fringed its patent.4 Another PAE, Project Paperless LLC, sent multiple demand 
letters for licensing fees and sued small businesses, claiming that anyone using 
an office scanner to scan documents and email them infringes its patent.5 
While lawsuits against customer end users have garnered some attention, 
end users are occupying a growing role beyond lawsuits filed by PAEs. End 
users were litigants in some of the main recent patent cases before the Supreme 
Court. In 2013, in the Supreme Court case Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, patients and physicians sued Myriad Genetics (“Myriad”) to 
invalidate Myriad’s breast cancer gene patents.6 Their goal was to enhance 
patients’ access to Myriad’s breast cancer genetic testing, which Myriad priced 
at $3,000.7 In the same year, in the Supreme Court case of Bowman v. Monsan-
to Co., Monsanto, which owns patents on genetically engineered seeds, sued 
farmers who re-used its seeds by saving some of the crops for re-planting the 
next season.8 
End user involvement is not limited to PAE lawsuits and major patent 
cases. In the pharmaceutical industry, patients increasingly find that competi-
tors of patented drug manufacturers fail to protect their interests. Patients, drug 
stores, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are challenging numerous 
agreements (known as pay-for-delay or reverse payment agreements) between 
patented drug manufacturers and generic manufacturers. Through these agree-
ments, patent owners compensate generic manufacturers not to enter the mar-
                                                                                                                           
 4 Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., EFF Files Challenge with Patent Office Against Troll’s Pod-
casting Patent, (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-files-challenge-patent-office-
against-trolls-podcasting-patent, archived at http://perma.cc/S563-PRK7?type=image. 
 5 Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000—for Using Scanners, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 2, 2013, 9:30 
AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-using-scanners/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/3JBX-CSHF; Steven Salzberg, Did You Scan and Email That Document? You Might 
Owe $1,000 to a Patent Troll, FORBES (Aug. 5, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steven
salzberg/2013/08/05/did-you-scan-and-email-that-document-you-might-owe-1000-to-a-patent-troll/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7N23-KQEZ?type=live. 
 6 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114 (2013); Com-
plaint at *3–13, *29–30, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. 
Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09 Civ. 4515) [hereinafter Complaint, Ass’n for Molecular Pa-
thology], available at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file939_39568.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/M2UA-YQZK, aff’d in part, rev’d in part 654 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, appeal 
reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2120. 
 7 See Complaint, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, supra note 6, at *3–13; Jonathan Stempel, Myriad 
Wins Gene Patent Ruling from US Appeals Court, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2012 4:23 PM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2012/08/16/us-myriad-patent-idUSBRE87F12K20120816, archived at http://perma.cc/459N-
Z447 (reporting on the cost of genetic testing for BRCA1/BRCA2). 
 8 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764–65 (2013); see Organic Seed Growers & 
Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Between 1997 and 2010, Mon-
santo brought some 144 infringement suits for unauthorized use of its seed. Approximately 700 other 
cases were settled without litigation.”). 
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ket. Plaintiffs are suing to invalidate these agreements in order to obtain access 
to less expensive generic drugs.9 The Supreme Court decided one of these cas-
es—FTC v. Actavis, Inc.—in 2013.10 
End users are likely to become even more prevalent in patent litigation as 
an emerging new technology—the Three-Dimensional (“3D”) printer—
becomes more popular.11 3D printers can replicate three-dimensional products 
and are becoming increasingly accessible to consumers.12 Recently, UPS start-
ed deploying these printers at its stores for general customer use and Staples 
sells them for approximately $1300.13 3D printers transform the access to the 
means of production by allowing consumers the opportunity to make items at 
home.14 This new capability increases the likelihood that an individual or a 
small business will make an infringing item that will expose them to patent 
liability.15 
End users may be individuals or businesses, they are often small but may 
not necessarily be so, and they occupy different roles in the patent litigation 
landscape. This Article defines end users broadly to include those using a patent-
ed technology for personal consumption and those using it in business. But im-
portantly, they are strictly users. End users may incorporate the patented tech-
nology within a product or service they offer to their customers, but they do not 
make or sell the technology itself. They are usually not knowledgeable about it. 
And, at times, they may even be unaware of its existence.16 
End users differ from small technological competitors in three respects. 
First, end users are usually individuals or businesses that are not technological 
companies (or do not produce and supply the allegedly infringing technology). 
This puts them at a significant disadvantage in patent disputes, where argu-
ments for patent invalidity and infringement need to rely on an intricate under-
standing of the patented technology, the prior art, and the alleged infringing 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See infra notes 101–123 and accompanying text. 
 10 See generally FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 11 A similar trend occurred in copyright law when digitization of copyrighted materials on the 
Internet exposed users to increased copyright liability. See generally Justin Hughes, On the Logic of 
Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 725 (2005) (discussing the music industry’s lawsuits against individuals who downloaded 
music on the Internet). 
 12 See Davis Doherty, Downloading Infringement: Patent Law as a Roadblock to the 3D Printing 
Revolution, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 353–54 (2012) (stating that, although 3D printers currently 
do not have the capabilities of Star Trek replicators, they are no longer an expensive curiosity). 
 13 Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitiza-
tion of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 10), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338067, archived at http://perma.cc/5Y3K-T5PP; see Doherty, 
supra note 12, at 357 (describing the market adoption of 3D printers). 
 14 See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 13 (manuscript at 8, 11–12). 
 15 See id. (manuscript at 6); Doherty, supra note 12, at 359. 
 16 See infra notes 124–150 and accompanying text. 
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technology. Second, end users usually become embroiled in the patent conflict 
relatively late in the life of the patent, after the patented technology enters the 
market and achieves widespread adoption. Third, end users are typically one-
time players. They are not in the business of producing and selling the technol-
ogy. In most cases the technology is ancillary to their business and they do not 
have a long-term stake. End users would, therefore, prefer to settle or withdraw 
from use of the technology, rather than pursue litigation.17 
As end users are taking a greater role at the center and in the shadows of 
patent litigation, they are faced with the absence of appropriate procedural liti-
gation tools. The equities of end user cases differ and so does our sympathy 
toward them. Some end users may be willful infringers while others may be 
individuals or small businesses unaware they are using a technology, whether 
patented or not.18 But, irrespective of whether their substantive claims are jus-
tified, end users are uniquely situated participants in patent litigation. End us-
ers need procedural tools that will grant them equal footing to that of patent 
owners and competitors. 
The promoters of the recent patent reform, the America Invents Act (the 
“AIA”), which came into effect primarily in 2013, intended patent legislation 
to catch up with the changing patent landscape.19 One of their goals was to 
protect the interests of small entities. Yet, the AIA failed to predict and is large-
ly ill-equipped to address the growing role of end users. A major set of reforms 
focused on procedures in the PTO. The objective was to provide an efficient, 
timely, and less costly alternative to the notoriously expensive patent litigation 
and assist the PTO by relying on the expertise of the public.20 The AIA amend-
ed the third party submission process to facilitate interested parties’ submis-
sions to challenge patent applications.21 It also created the post-grant review 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 124–150 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 124–150 and accompanying text. Some commentators propose that end users 
should be given immunity from lawsuits. See, e.g., Legislative Solutions for Patent Reform, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. https://www.eff.org/issues/legislative-solutions-patent-reform#enduser, archived 
at http://perma.cc/HX8C-XLQV (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). This Article does not weigh the equity 
of end users cases and does not presume that all end users are necessarily blameless. End users come 
in all shades and colors. Instead, the Article’s goal is more limited to placing end users in a more 
equal procedural footing with the traditional patent players. 
 19 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 20 See Bradley William Baumeister, Critique of the New Rule 1.99: Third-Party Information Dis-
closure Procedure for Published Pre-Grant Applications, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 381, 
387–88 (2001) (explaining that the public would provide the PTO with public documents that, in an 
ideal world, the examiner could find on his own); Philip De Corte et al., AIA Post-Grant Review & 
European Oppositions: Will They Work in Tandem, or Rather Pass Like Ships in the Night?, 14 N.C. 
J.L. & TECH. 93, 126 (2012) (explaining that the goal of creating the post-grant review was to create a 
less expensive, more efficient alternative to litigation to challenge patent validity). 
 21 See infra notes 198–205 and accompanying text. 
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procedure to provide a forum for challenging a patent application in the PTO.22 
These procedures, however, fail to address the needs of end users, mainly be-
cause they are available only very early in the life of the patent. A party can 
submit a third party submission no later than the issuance of the patent,23 while 
a petitioner can challenge a patent’s validity in a post-grant review only up to 
nine months from the issuance of the patent.24 End users are unlikely to be 
aware of the technology so early in the life of the patent because it usually has 
not yet entered the market, and even if it has, it is unlikely to have already 
gained widespread adoption.25 
Congress created two additional procedures—the inter partes review and 
the covered business method patent review—where a petitioner can challenge 
a patent’s validity after the post-grant window closes.26 But, although end us-
ers could time-wise avail themselves of the inter partes review, the scope of 
permitted challenges is significantly narrower than in the post-grant review 
procedure, limiting the options for such a challenge.27 The covered business 
method patent review is also a limited alternative for end users, particularly 
because it is available only to petitioners who are directly sued or threatened 
by the patentee.28 
Another AIA reform expanded the prior user rights defense. A party who 
successfully asserts user rights can continue using the patented invention with-
out paying licensing fees within certain restrictions.29 The defense now applies 
to all inventions, not just business methods, and importantly, no longer re-
quires that the party asserting the defense be the inventor who reduced the in-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 206–213 and accompanying text. 
 23 A party can submit a third party submission, as long as it is submitted before the earlier of (i) 
the date of notice of allowance, or (ii) the later of: six months from the publication of the application 
or the date of the first rejection by an examiner. 35 U.S.C. § 122(e) (2012). 
 24 See id. § 321(c). 
 25 Technologies have different adoption rates and some may be adopted earlier than others. But 
generally, it is less likely that money will be invested in commercialization before a patent is granted. 
See EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 219–66 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing rates of 
adoption of new technologies and the factors affecting those rates). See generally Christoper A. Co-
tropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (2009) (discussing the problem 
of patenting early in the technological cycle before the technology is ready for commercialization); 
Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010) (same). 
 26 See 35 U.S.C. § 311(c) (providing the filing window for an inter partes review); 37 C.F.R. 
§ 42.303 (2013) (providing the filing window for business method patents review). 
 27 Challenges under inter partes review are limited to narrower grounds, i.e., only prior art and 
obviousness, while challenges under post-grant review can extend to broader grounds, including sub-
ject matter, utility, definiteness, written description and enablement. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (provid-
ing the grounds permitted for challenges under inter-partes review); id. § 321(b) (providing the 
grounds permitted for challenges under post-grant review). 
 28 See infra notes 219–230 and accompanying text. 
 29 See DAVID J. KAPPOS & TERESA STANEK REA, UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OF-
FICE, REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE 5 (2012). 
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vention to practice.30 Eliminating the reduction to practice requirement pro-
vides end users with access to the defense. To take advantage of the defense, 
however, the end user needs to have used the invention in commerce at least 
one year before the filing of the patent application or public disclosure.31 This 
renders the prior user rights defense largely inapplicable to end users, who are 
less likely to have access to the technology that early in the life of the patent. 
The AIA’s failure to account for the rise of the end user leaves end users 
without tools that can put them on more equal footing with traditional patent 
litigation parties. This Article examines the role that fee shifting of litigation 
expenses to the prevailing party can play in end user cases. Fee shifting, by no 
means, will motivate all end users to litigate even meritorious cases and chal-
lenge potentially invalid patents. The advent of the end user is a complex phe-
nomenon. A series of reforms is needed to address this transformation, includ-
ing: changing the standards for standing to sue in patent litigation;32 expanding 
the customer suit exception;33 and changing contractual practices to incorpo-
rate more frequent use of indemnification procedures between manufacturers 
and customers. Nonetheless, fee shifting is applicable to the diverse array of 
end user cases and can contribute toward leveling the footing of end users in 
all type of end user-patentee disputes. 
The general U.S. rule governing fee shifting (“The American Rule”) does 
not allow the prevailing party to recover legal fees from the loser.34 Congress, 
however, has carved out many exceptions to the American Rule that allows for 
fee shifting to the prevailing party.35 The current standard under the Patent Act 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012); see also KAPPOS & REA, supra note 29, at 18 (stating that the 
AIA does not require the party asserting prior use rights to be the actual inventor). 
 31 See infra notes 231–238 and accompanying text. 
 32 For further discussion addressing this issue of end users’ standing to sue for declaratory judg-
ment in a separate article, see generally Gaia Bernstein, End Users and Standing to Sue (Oct. 6, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 33 See generally Love & Yoon, supra note 1 (proposing expanding the customer suit exception as 
a solution to PAEs’ lawsuits against customers). 
 34 See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (“The general practice of the Unit-
ed States is in opposition to [the indemnity rule] and even if that practice were not strictly correct in 
principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute.”). 
 35 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012) 
(“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasona-
ble attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”); see also Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward 
a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 TEX. L. REV. 865, 866 (1992) (stating that “[f]ee shifting is common 
in federal cases” and that by enacting over 150 statutes entitling parties who prevail to claim fee 
awards, Congress greatly restricted the American Rule); Peter N. Cubita et al., Note, Awards of Attor-
ney’s Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 277, 286–89 (1982) (describing federal stat-
utes that authorize awards of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties).  
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is that courts have the discretion to grant attorney’s fees to the prevailing party 
in “exceptional circumstances.”36  
This exceptional circumstances standard has recently come under close 
scrutiny. Recently, the Supreme Court decided important cases involving fee 
shifting in patent litigation.37 In 2014, in Octane Fitness LLC v. ICON Health 
& Fitness, Inc., the Court lowered the standard for awarding fee shifting in 
patent litigation.38 At the same time, Congress is considering multiple bills ad-
vocating different versions of fee shifting.39 The impetus for this activity is 
concern regarding the impact of PAE lawsuits on innovation.40 The petitions 
before the Court and some of the bills presented to Congress focused on facili-
tating fee shifting generally, without targeting PAEs specifically, while other 
bills focused on PAEs, making it more likely that fee shifting to the prevailing 
party will occur if the loser is a PAE.41 
This Article argues that the case for fee shifting is particularly strong 
where end users are implicated. First, there is significant inequality between 
the parties when an end user is a part of litigation.42 Patent litigation is exorbi-
tantly expensive compared to many other forms of civil litigation.43 These 
costs are even higher for end users because patent litigation relies on techno-
logical expertise to invalidate a patent. End users, unlike technological com-
petitors, cannot rely on in-house expertise and need to expend significant re-
sources on external experts. In addition, unlike patent owners, they cannot 
avail themselves of contingent fee representation.44 This puts end users at a 
significant disadvantage, making them much more likely to settle and avoid 
litigation even when their claims are meritorious. 
                                                                                                                           
 36 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). 
 37 See generally Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); 
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
 38 See 134 S. Ct. at 1755–58. 
 39 See Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); Patent Litigation Integrity Act, S. 
1612, 113th Cong. § 101 (2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 5 (2013); Sav-
ing High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. § 2 
(2013). 
 40 See, e.g., H.R. 3309 (amending the Patent Act to provide that attorney fees will be awarded to 
the prevailing party, unless the court finds that the conduct or position of the non-prevailing party 
were substantially justified, or that special circumstances make the award unjust); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 17–20, Octane Fitness LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 Fed. Appx. 57 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (No. 12-1184), 2013 WL 1309080, at *17–20 (arguing for the need to lower the standard for an 
alleged infringer to prove exceptional circumstances under Section 285 of the Patent Act). 
 41 See, e.g., H.R. 845 (indicating that the Patent Act’s fee shifting provision only applies if the 
non-prevailing entity is a PAE). 
 42 See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 763, 792–93 (2002) (explaining that fee shifting helps equalize a disparity in strength between 
parties). 
 43 See infra notes 256–273 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 256–273 and accompanying text. 
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Second, end users may want to initiate patent litigation as a preemptive 
measure to seek declaratory judgment of patent invalidity.45 Currently, there 
are significant disincentives for bringing a declaratory judgment action, includ-
ing the expense of litigation, lack of financial rewards, and the risks of trigger-
ing countersuits of infringement.46 At the same time, a declaratory judgment of 
patent invalidity can be beneficial to many potential infringers not directly be-
fore the court.47 Consequently, actions for declaratory judgment are relatively 
rare in patent litigation.48 Fee shifting can help resolve this collective action 
problem and encourage more declaratory judgment lawsuits under a private 
attorney general theory.49 
Third, PAEs threaten and sue thousands of users, asserting, what many be-
lieve, are weak patent claims.50 These users tend to settle even when their cases 
are meritorious. Commentators believe that fee shifting is likely to at least re-
duce the number of meritless patent suits, even if it is unclear whether it will 
reduce the number of settlements.51 In addition, fee shifting can serve a punitive 
function to deter and punish such abusive litigation practices.52 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Standing for declaratory judgment patent lawsuits, however, is currently under much debate, 
and can affect some end users’ ability to sue for declaratory judgment. See Organic Seed Growers & 
Trade Ass’n, 718 F.3d at 1361 (holding that the end user-appellants lacked standing to bring a declara-
tory judgment suit). See generally Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2359873&download=yes, archived at http://perma.cc/HR56-R3NJ (arguing for the need for broad-
er grounds for standing in patent cases). For further discussion on standing issues relating to end us-
ers, see generally Bernstein, supra note 32.  
 46 Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 44 (2012). 
 47 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found. 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding that a 
patent infringer can use issue-preclusion to foreclose an infringement suit where the patent claim in 
question had already been declared invalid in an earlier suit). 
 48 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect 
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 921 (2001) (finding that only fourteen percent of the patent cases 
filed annually were declaratory judgment actions). 
 49 The Private Attorney General advocates fee shifting to encourage filing lawsuits where the 
litigation serves a public or broader private interest. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of 
Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662–63. 
 50 John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 677, 693–94 (2011) (finding PAE suits were much less likely than non-PAE suits to result in a 
ruling for patentee); Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent 
Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1603–04 (2009) (discussing allegations that PAEs file 
suits based on weak patents); Chien & Reines, supra note 1, at 8–11 (discussing PAE lawsuits against 
numerous technological customers). 
 51 See Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the American Legal Sys-
tem: An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 567, 581–83 
(2011); Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1161, 1161–62 
(1996); Rowe, supra note 49, at 665–66; Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation 
of Public Policy, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 193 (1984). 
 52 For discussions of the punitive function of fee shifting, see Rowe, supra note 49, at 653; Cubita 
et al., supra note 35, at 288. 
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End users would benefit from any change that facilitates fee shifting, par-
ticularly pro-alleged infringer fee shifting. General changes to fee shifting 
standards, however, are less likely to be effective because they do not carry a 
direct message to the end user.53 Moreover, changes to fee shifting standards 
that focus on PAE status resolve only a subset of end user cases. This Article, 
therefore, proposes including the end user status as a factor that weighs in fa-
vor of fee shifting.  
While this Article defines end user broadly, including end user status as a 
factor in the fee shifting analysis enables a more granular investigation into the 
nature of the specific end user. Even prevailing end users who are not liable for 
infringement can differ significantly. For example, although most end users 
know little about the patented technology, some are technological innovators 
and for other users the patented technology is central to their business. In these 
cases, inequality between the parties may not be as significant and the justifi-
cation for fee shifting weaker. In other cases, end users may represent a broad-
er public interest in a declaratory judgment action. In these instances, the pri-
vate attorney general theory will strengthen the case for fee shifting. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the growing role of end 
users in patent litigation.54 Part II discusses the reasons for the shift from a 
competitor model to a hybrid competitor-user model and distinguishes the 
characteristics of the end user from those of the traditional competitor.55 Part 
III then shows that the AIA largely fails to protect the interests of the end us-
er.56 Finally, Part IV discusses the contemporary fee shifting debate and argues 
that there is a strong case for including end user status as a factor in fee shift-
ing analysis in patent cases.57 
I. THE GROWING ROLE OF THE END USER IN PATENT LITIGATION 
Many believe that until recently end users have largely been absent from 
patent litigation.58 At the same time, there are some reports indicating that end 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Laws have both coercive and expressive effects. The expressive function of the law delivers a 
message to the public. See Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Dis-
crimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241, 287 (2006) (discussing the expressive power 
of the law); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 338, 397–400 (1997) (same). See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expres-
sive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000) (same); Steven D. 
Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudence and the Depletion of Meaning, 60 MD. L. REV. 506 (2001) (same). 
 54 See infra notes 58–123 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 124–179 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 180–238 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 239–342 and accompanying text. 
 58 Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, and Potential Solu-
tions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Internet of the Comm. on the 
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users have been part of patent litigation during certain historical periods.59 
Empirical research needs to be conducted to establish the exact scope of the 
transformation. Yet, few doubt that a change has indeed been taking place. This 
Part shows that end users are appearing in patent litigation not just as defend-
ants in PAE lawsuits but in a variety of roles. They have appeared as parties in 
recent major patent cases before the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 
both as defendants and as plaintiffs in declaratory judgment suits. They also 
take a central role in challenging pay-for-delay agreements between patent 
owners and generic manufacturers that undermine users’ interests in access to 
cheaper drugs. 
A. End Users as Parties in Major Patent Cases 
End users have played an important role in some of the major patent law 
cases litigated before the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit.60 They appeared 
as both plaintiffs in declaratory judgment actions and as defendants. In 2013, 
in the Supreme Court case of Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, pa-
tients and physicians sued to invalidate Myriad’s breast cancer gene patents.61 
Myriad owned the patents on BRCA1/BRCA2, which are the genetic muta-
tions responsible for a high risk of breast and ovarian cancer. Myriad charged 
$3,000 for testing for the breast cancer genetic mutations, a rate significantly 
higher than rates charged for other genetic tests.62 In addition, Myriad sent 
                                                                                                                           
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 9–11 (2013) (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General 
Counsel, Cisco Systems, Incorporated) (testifying that the problem of PAE lawsuits has now spread to 
customers); id. at 35 (statement of Janet L. Dhillon, Executive Vice President, General Counsel and 
Corporate Secretary, JCPenney Company, Incorporated) (testifying that, prior to 2009, JCPenney 
never had to defend against a patent lawsuit, but had to defend approximately two dozen patent law-
suits between 2010 and 2013); Chien & Reines, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that “customer suits have 
been, until recently, relatively uncommon”); Scott Shane, How to Neuter Patent Trolls, BUSINESS
WEEK (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-26/how-to-neuter-patent-
trolls, archived at http://perma.cc/8BWS-5GGC (describing PAE suits against small businesses as a 
new trend). 
 59 See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innova-
tion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1819–25 (2007) (describing the existence of patent trolls in the 
Nineteenth Century who enforced agricultural patents). 
 60 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2114; Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765; Organic 
Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, 718 F.3d at 1353. 
 61 Complaint, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, supra note 6, at *3–13, *29–30. 
 62 Jonathan Stempel, Myriad Wins Gene Patent Ruling from US Appeals Court, REUTERS, (Aug. 6, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/16/us-myriad-patent-idUSBRE87F12K20120816, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/43A6-D7TW (reporting on the cost of genetic testing for BRCA1/BRCA2); 
What Is the Cost of Genetic Testing, and How Long Does It Take to Get the Results?, GENETICS HOME 
REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/testing/costresults, archived at http://perma.cc/Z94L-4GSP 
(last updated Aug. 12, 2014) (stating that the cost of genetic testing can range from less than $100 to 
more than $2,000). 
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cease and desist letters to physicians and laboratories that offered testing.63 As 
a result, patients could only test through Myriad. Some patients were unable to 
test due to the high fees and lack of insurance coverage for genetic testing.64 In 
addition, patients could not undergo repeat testing with another entity to con-
firm accuracy or undergo more extensive testing.65 A group of patients joined 
forces with physicians, laboratories, medical centers, and non-profit organiza-
tions seeking a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity.66 The case garnered 
significant media and academic attention67 and was eventually decided by the 
Supreme Court in June 2013.68 
That same year, in the Supreme Court case of Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 
the owner of patents on genetically engineered seeds that are resistant to herbi-
cide, sued Bowman, a farmer who re-used the seeds.69 Monsanto’s genetically 
engineered seed, which is resistant to the herbicide, enables farmers to spray 
herbicide on crops in order to destroy weeds without destroying the crops.70 
But, the seed also has an additional quality of self-replication. Farmers can 
purchase the seeds once and save some crops to re-plant in subsequent sea-
sons.71 To prevent this, Monsanto required farmers who bought the patented 
seed to sign a contract agreeing not to use the seed for an additional season. 
According to the agreement, none of the crops grown could be re-planted.72 
Monsanto sued or threatened to sue over 800 farmers who re-planted the self-
replicating seeds.73 The Court decided the case on May 2013.74 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d 1303, 1314–15 (describing the cease and desist letters 
sent by Myriad). 
 64 Id. at 1315; Complaint, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, supra note 6, at *2. 
 65 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1315; Complaint, Ass’n for Molecular Pathol-
ogy, supra note 6, at *10–13. 
 66 See Complaint, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, supra note 6, at *3–13. 
 67 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Edifying Thoughts of a Patent Watcher: The Nature of DNA, 60 UCLA 
L. REV. DISCOURSE 92 (2013) (criticizing the focus on the products of nature doctrine); Robert Barnes 
& Brady Dennis, Supreme Court Rules Human Genes May Not Be Patented, WASH. POST, June 13, 
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-rules-human-genes-may-not-be-patented/
2013/06/13/9e5c55d2-d43d-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L7Z7-
DGAX (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision); Adam Liptak, Justices, 9-0, Bar Patenting 
Human Genes, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/
14/us/supreme-court-rules-human-genes-may-not-be-patented.html, archived at http://perma.cc/KTT6-
M4RW (same). 
 68 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2107. 
 69 133 S. Ct. at 1764–65. 
 70 Id. at 1764. 
 71 Id. at 1764–65. 
 72 Id. at 1764. 
 73 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, 718 F.3d at 1353 (“Between 1997 and 2010, Monsanto 
brought some 144 infringement suits for unauthorized use of its seed. Approximately 700 other cases 
were settled without litigation.”); see Jeremy N. Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies, 16 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 229, 235–38 (2013), available at https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-
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Finally, in 2013, the Federal Circuit considered Organic Seed Growers & 
Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., where organic farmers, who did not use Monsan-
to’s genetically engineered seed, filed suit for declaratory judgment that Mon-
santo’s patents were invalid.75 The organic farmers sued because the wind may 
blow seeds from one field to another, causing Monsanto’s seeds to grow in their 
fields.76 Given Monsanto’s extensive history of lawsuits against farmers, they 
were concerned that Monsanto would sue them for inadvertently growing the 
patented seeds.77 To prevent this, the organic farmers decided to act proactively 
and file suit for a judgment declaring that Monsanto’s patents are invalid.78 The 
Federal Circuit decided the case in June 2013. The Court held that the farmers 
lacked standing and denied their request for declaratory judgment.79 
B. PAEs’ Litigation Against Customers 
PAEs are a relatively recent phenomenon in patent litigation.80 Nonethe-
less, they currently file the majority of patent lawsuits in the United States.81 
They do not manufacture or sell the patented technology. Instead, these com-
panies purchase patents in order to enforce them. PAEs have a number of busi-
ness strategies.82  
A prominent group of PAEs, defined as the “bottom feeder trolls,” threatens 
and sues large numbers of alleged infringers.83 Unlike patent owners who are in 
                                                                                                                           
technology-law-review-stlr/online/self-replicatingtechnologies.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5UMQ-
LTJD (discussing Monsanto’s suits against farmers). 
 74 Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765–66, 1769. 
 75 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, 718 F.3d at 1353–54. 
 76 See id. at 1356–57.  
 77 Id. at 1353. 
 78 Id. at 1353–54; First Amended Complaint at *1, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, v. Mon-
santo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-cv-2163-NRB) [hereinafter Complaint, Organic 
Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n], available at http://www.pubpat.org/assets/files/seed/OSGATA-v-
Monsanto-Complaint.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AY7S-P73Q. 
 79 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, 718 F.3d at 1360–61. 
 80 Litigations Over Time, PATENT FREEDOM, https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/
litigations, archived at http://perma.cc/ZCE5-7MKP (last updated July 14, 2014) (showing the dra-
matic increase in PAE lawsuits from 2004 onward). 
 81 See Colleen V. Chien, Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law, Patent Assertion Entities 
Presentation at FTC/DOJ Hearings on PAEs, 23 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314, archived at http://perma.cc/ZYV6-972E. 
 82 See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2117, 2123 (2013) (discussing the different business strategies employed by PAEs). 
 83 See id. at 2126; see also Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting 
Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 691–92 (2012) (describing PAEs’ strategy of joining multiple 
unrelated defendants); Stijepko Tokic, The Role of Consumers in Deterring Settlement Agreements 
Based on Invalid Patents: The Case of Non-Practicing Entities, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 9, 
available at http://dl4a.org/uploads/pdf/tokic-role-of-consumers.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
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the business of marketing their inventions, PAEs do not have a business relation-
ship they need cultivate with customers. Therefore, increasingly, these PAEs 
have been suing end users who are customers of a manufacturer or supplier of 
the alleged infringing technology.84 Bottom feeders target customers for their use 
or adoption of existing technology.85 
PAE suits against customers have become increasingly common. PAEs 
find customer lawsuits attractive. First, these lawsuits provide PAEs with a 
large number of potential targets.86 Second, customers, who are not technolog-
ical companies with know-how regarding the patent, are easy targets who pre-
fer to settle instead of entering expensive litigation.87 The following are a few 
illustrative examples of PAEs’ enforcement actions against end users. 
One PAE, Innovatio, acquired patent rights to certain wireless Internet 
technologies, which it claims are necessary to implement the standards for 
wireless local area networking (Wi-Fi).88 Wi-Fi technology is ubiquitously 
used. To enforce its patent rights, Innovatio has sent more than 8,000 in-
fringement letters to businesses that use Wi-Fi technology and has initiated 
twenty-three lawsuits.89 Innovatio’s enforcement measures targeted many end 
users who are not technological companies. Some businesses, such as bakeries, 
restaurants and cafes, offer wireless technology to their customers, while other 
businesses use it for their internal business operations.90 
Another PAE, ArrivalStar, owns patent rights that allegedly cover systems 
and methods that enable users to receive vehicle or shipment status and arrival 
information through cell phones, telephones, and computers.91 It has filed hun-
dreds of lawsuits, mostly ending in settlements, and has sent many more in-
                                                                                                                           
FQD8-UFX3 (stating that there have been cases where PAEs sued over 20 defendants in one lawsuit); 
Chien & Reines, supra note 1, at 8–10 (discussing PAE lawsuits against many customers). 
 84 See Chien & Reines, supra note 1, at 2 (indicating that PAE suits against customers have be-
come increasingly common).  
 85 Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461 (2014), https://
journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-review/online/startupsandpatent
trolls.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F3QH-FCXZ. 
 86 See id. at 461–62. 
 87 See Magliocca, supra note 59, at 1813 (discussing the preference of those threatened by PAEs to 
settle); Randall R. Rader et al., Op-Ed., Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html?_r=0, archived at 
http://perma.cc/57SC-GQZF (describing the PAE business model, which is based on extracting financial 
settlements). 
 88 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 89 Id. at 907, 909. 
 90 Id. at 906. 
 91 In re ArrivalStar S.A. Fleet Mgmt. Sys. Patent Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 
2011). 
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fringement letters.92 One of ArrivalStar’s primary targets has been public trans-
it systems. It has sued public transit systems in many major cities, including, 
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and New York City Transit Authori-
ty, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, the Maryland Transit Ad-
ministration, the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, and the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey.93 ArrivalStar alleged that its patents 
cover systems monitoring travel data. Specifically, they pointed to systems 
allowing users to contact the transit authority by SMS text message to request 
arrival times for vehicles monitored by the system; the system then texts back 
the arrival time of the train or bus to the user.94 Nearly all public transit sys-
tems preferred to avoid expensive litigation and have settled for amounts be-
tween $50,000 and $75,000.95 In June 2013, the American Public Transporta-
tion Association, took a proactive step and filed suit for declaratory judgment 
of patent invalidity against ArrivalStar to protect its members from Arri-
valStar’s enforcement measures.96 
Finally, Lodsys, LLC (“Lodsys”) has sent infringement letters and sued to 
enforce its software patents against non-technology companies, asserting that 
these companies infringe Lodsys’ patents by incorporating its patented tech-
nology into their company websites.97 Specifically, Lodsys claimed that these 
companies infringed its patents through use of live interactive chat with con-
                                                                                                                           
 92 Id.; Joe Mullin, Patent Troll That Sues Public Transit Systems Gets Hauled into Court, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 27, 2013, 1:30 AM), http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/06/patent-troll-
that-sues-public-transit-systems-gets-hauled-into-court/, archived at http://perma.cc/GA94-Q8M7. 
 93 Complaint at 3, 6–7, Am. Pub. Transp. Ass’n v. ArrivalStar S.A., No. 1:13-cv-04375-ALC 
(S.D.N.Y. filed June 25, 2013) [hereinafter Complaint, Am. Pub. Transp. Ass’n]. 
 94 See, e.g., Letter from ArrivalStar S.A. et al., to Toledo Area Reg’l Transit Auth. (Feb. 22, 
2012). 
 95 See Complaint, Am. Pub. Transp. Ass’n, supra note 93, at 1–2 (stating that nearly all of the 
targeted public transportation agencies preferred to settle quickly); Joe Mullin, A New Target for Tech 
Patent Trolls: Cash Strapped-American Cities, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 15, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://
www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/03/a-new-low-for-patent-trolls-targeting-cash-strapped-cities, 
archived at http://perma.cc/5HDW-MF9P (reporting that most public transportation authorities settled 
quickly for $50,000–$75,000). The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, however, decided to 
fight ArrivalStar. See ArrivalStar S.A., v. Port Auth., No. 11 CIV. 1808, 2012 WL 1059693, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying the Port Authority’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). 
 96 Complaint, Am. Public Trans. Ass’n, supra note 93, at 2, 10–13. 
 97 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 4–5, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Lodsys, LLC, No. 2:12-cv-
00550-CNC (E.D. Wis. filed June 1, 2012) [hereinafter Complaint, Oracle Am.] (stating that Lodsys sent 
infringement letters to and sued Oracle customers); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 3–4, Foresee 
Results, Inc., v. Lodsys, LLC, No. 11-cv-3886 (N.D. Ill. filed June 6, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint, 
Foresee Results, Inc.], available at http://thepriorart.typepad.com/files/foresee-results-complaint.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/R3EF-Y4MZ (describing cease and desist letters); Josh Lowensohn, Lodsys 
Files Suit Against New York Times, Five Others, CNET NEWS (July 5, 2011, 2:27 PM), http://
news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20076975-38/lodsys-files-suit-against-new-york-times-five-others/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/3WFL-35D6 (describing Lodsys’ patent enforcement actions against technolo-
gy companies and retailers). 
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sumers and consumer survey functions on their company websites.98 Lodsys 
sued many non-technology companies including Adidas America, Best Buy 
Solutions, Inc., Best Western International, CVS Caremark Corporation, and 
Vitamin Shoppe.99 The defendant companies purchased the alleged patented 
technology from technology companies that manufactured it. Oracle, for ex-
ample, reported that within a year-and-a-half period, Lodsys sent infringement 
letters to dozens of its customers, some of its customers, such as Walgreens, 
were eventually sued.100 
C. End Users and Pay-for-Delay Agreements in the  
Pharmaceutical Industry 
In the pharmaceutical industry, competitors’ and users’ interests increas-
ingly diverge. This occurs when generic manufacturers and patent owners 
reach settlements that are not in the best interests of patients who seek access 
to less expensive drugs. Although the FTC (representing consumer interests) 
has played an important role challenging these settlements,101 patients102 and 
drugstores103 have also sued independently to challenge these agreements.104 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Complaint for Patent Infringement at 3–6, Lodsys, LLC v. Adidas Am., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-
00283 (E.D. Tex. filed June 10, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint, Lodsys, LLC]. See generally Joe 
Mullin, Patent Troll Lodsys Sues Mobile Game Makers, Despite Apple’s Intervention, ARS TECHNI-
CA, (Apr. 7, 2013, 9:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/04/patent-troll-lodsys-sues-10-
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00090-JRG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85614, at *6–9 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2013). 
 99 Complaint, Lodsys, LLC, supra note 98, at 1–2. 
 100 See Complaint, Oracle Am., supra note 97, at 4–5. 
 101 See, e.g., Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (urging the Supreme Court to hold that reverse payment 
settlement agreements are presumptively unlawful). 
 102 For more examples of lawsuits by patients, see In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1327, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (individual drug purchasers and several advo-
cacy groups challenging an agreement between patentee and generic drug manufacturer regarding the 
drug Cipro); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 899–900 (6th Cir. 2003) (individual 
drug purchasers of Cardizem CD challenging an agreement between a patentee and generic drug man-
ufacturer); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 123–24 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(individual drug purchasers, medical benefits organizations, and consumer advocacy groups challeng-
ing an agreement between a patentee and generic drug manufacturer regarding the drug Tamoxifen 
Citrate); In re Buspirone Patent & Antitrust Litig., 210 F.R.D. 43, 46–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (individual 
drug purchasers suing with others to challenge an agreement between a patentee and generic drug 
manufacturer regarding the drug buspirone). 
 103 For examples of lawsuits by drugstores, see Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 
F.3d 1181, 1183–84 (11th Cir. 2003) (wholesalers selling the drug terazosin hydrochloride challeng-
ing an agreement between a patentee and generic drug manufacturer); In re Skelaxin Metaxalone 
Antitrust Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70968, at *8–9 (E.D. Tenn. May 20, 2013) (drugstores suing 
with others to challenge an agreement between a patentee and generic drug manufacturer regarding 
the drug metaxalone); In re Neurontin Antitrust Litig., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77475, at *2, 16 
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A pharmaceutical company seeking to market a new drug to the public 
needs to obtain approval from the FDA by submitting a New Drug Application 
(“NDA”).105 The submission of an NDA is extremely expensive and time-
consuming.106 The Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic drug manufacturers to file 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), which relies on the infor-
mation in a NDA previously filed for a patented drug.107 A generic manufacturer 
filing an ANDA needs to certify that the drug does not infringe a patent.108 One 
way to certify non-infringement is through a process known as “Paragraph IV 
Certification.”109 Under the Paragraph IV Certification process, the generic 
manufacturer certifies that the patent either is invalid or will not be infringed by 
the proposed generic product.110 The patent owner then has forty-five days to file 
an infringement suit in court, and if such a suit is filed, the FDA may not ap-
prove the generic drug for thirty months or until the suit is resolved, whichever 
occurs earlier.111 The result is often a lengthy and expensive litigation that patent 
owners prefer to settle. One type of settlement that has received significant atten-
tion is called a “reverse payment agreement” or “pay-for-delay agreement.”112 
While a primary goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase the avail-
ability of low cost drugs to patients, “pay-for delay” agreements undermine 
this objective. Under the Hatch-Waxman scheme the first generic company that 
files Paragraph IV certification receives 180 days exclusivity.113 Once this 
180-day period is over and multiple generic companies enter the market, the 
drug price typically drops significantly.114 Pay-for-delay agreements prevent 
the public from enjoying the benefits of competition. In such agreements, the 
                                                                                                                           
(D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2009) (Rite-Aid, CVS, and other direct purchasers of the drug Neurontin challenging 
an agreement between a patentee and generic drug manufacturer). 
 104 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to Innovate 
After MedImmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 972 (2009) (discussing the divergence between the 
public interest and competitors’ interests). 
 105 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). 
 106 C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay; Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory De-
sign Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1564 (2006). 
 107 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
 108 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 109 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 112 See Carl W. Hittinger & Lesli C. Esposito, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation: The Third Cir-
cuit’s Controversial Pay-for-Delay Antitrust Decision Splits with Other Circuit Courts, 58 VILL. L. 
REV. 103, 105 (2013). 
 113 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 114 C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J 947, 953 (2011); see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW IN-
CREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHAR-
MACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 28 (1998) (describing the drop in the cost of drugs once generic drugs enter 
the market). 
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generic manufacturer typically agrees to delay entering the market in return for 
monetary compensation.115 Although these agreements serve the interests of 
both the patentee and the competitors, consumers’ interests in obtaining less 
expensive access to essential drugs are hindered. 
Pay-for-delay agreements are becoming increasingly common. The FTC 
assessed that in 2012, forty settlements between patent owners and generic 
manufacturers involved pay-for-delay agreements.116 In 2013, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in several cases involving such agreements.117 In FTC 
v. Actavis, the FTC represented end-users’ interests to challenge pay-for-delay 
agreements involving a drug called AndroGel, which increases testosterone 
levels for men.118 And, in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, end-users: whole-
salers, such as Walgreens and CVS Pharmacy, that sell the drug K-Dur, which 
treats low blood levels of Potassium, challenged the settlement agreement.119 
The Court decided the cases in June 2013, and held that such agreements are 
not presumptively invalid and, thus, the conflict between end user and compet-
itor interests remains.120 
End users’ roles in challenging pay-for-delay agreements differ in two re-
spects from end users’ roles in other forms of patent litigation. First, in other 
cases, end users interests are usually aligned with those of competitors. For 
example, in PAE litigation the manufacturer and its end user customers seek to 
                                                                                                                           
 115 David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch-
Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1307–08 (2010); see C. Scott Hemphill, Drug Patent 
Settlements Between Rivals: A Survey, 4 (2007) (Columbia Law School, Working Paper 2007), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969492, archived at http://perma.cc/
4LQ6-8VBF. 
 116 BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNI-
ZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012, at 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-trade-commission-
under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-and/130117mmareport.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/LJC9-AWHG. These 2012 numbers can be compared to twenty-eight settlements involving pay-
for-delay agreements in 2011, thirty-one in 2010, nineteen in 2009, sixteen in 2008, fourteen in 2007, 
fourteen in 2006, three in 2005, and zero in 2004. Id. at 2. 
 117 Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849, 2849 (2013) (granting 
certiorari); Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849, 2849 (2013) (same); FTC v. 
Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787, 787 (2012) (same). 
 118 133 S. Ct. at 2229–30 (describing the FTC’s lawsuit); see ANDROGEL, http://www.androgel.com, 
archived at http://perma.cc/MLT9-J7XK (last visited Nov. 12, 2014) (describing the function of Andro-
gel). 
 119 686 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2012) (describing the parties to the lawsuit), vacated sub nom. 
Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2849. K-Dur treats low blood levels of potassium. K-Dur, 
DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/k-dur.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GEX6-CYSA (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2014). 
 120 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (declining to find that pay-for-delay agreements are presumptively 
invalid); see Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2849 (vacating and remanding In re K-Dur Anti-
trust Litig. in light of the decision in Actavis); Merck & Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2849 (same). 
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defeat the patentee’s infringement claims. Conversely, in pay-for-delay cases, 
the generic manufacturer competitor and the patent owner brand name act to-
gether to resist the end user’s challenge of the settlement agreement.121 It is the 
different alignment of the parties’ interests that underscores the importance of 
assessing the new role of the end user. As pay-for-delay agreements indicate, 
end users cannot always rely on competitors for protection.  
Second, the litigation concerning pay-for-delay agreements is, in a sense, a 
hybrid creature of patent and antitrust litigation. Pay-for-delay agreements are an 
inadvertent result of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s Paragraph IV Certification pro-
cess. The Hatch-Waxman Act is patent legislation designed to encourage early 
entry of generic versions of patented drugs into the market. At the same time, 
petitioners challenging these agreements, including end users, challenge them 
through antitrust claims.122 Unlike patent law, antitrust law is more flexible re-
garding consumers’ standing to sue.123 The relaxed standing standards explain 
the prevalence of end users, such as patients and drugstores, as plaintiffs in these 
lawsuits. At the same time, it highlights the fact that when end users can avail 
themselves of procedural tools that enable them to partake in patent disputes, 
they will take advantage of them and become active participants. 
II. FROM A COMPETITOR MODEL TO A HYBRID COMPETITOR-USER MODEL 
End users may be businesses or individuals and may have different roles 
in patent litigation. This Article defines end users broadly to encompass users 
who use the patented technology for personal consumption or in business. End 
users, however, are not in the business of making or directly selling the tech-
nology. This Part differentiates end users from small technological competi-
tors, by highlighting three characteristics: (i) end users are not technologically 
sophisticated; (ii) they tend to enter the patent conflict later in the life of the 
patent; and (iii) they are often one-time players. It then turns to describe the 
shift from the traditional model that focuses on the patentee and the competitor 
to a model that includes end users as players in patent litigation. Finally, this 
Part analyzes the reasons for the rise of the end user in patent litigation, point-
ing to a combination of technological change and a transformation in litigation 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive 
Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 39–40 (2009) (discussing the shared incentives of patentees and 
generic manufacturers). 
 122 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme 
Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3 (2014) (discussing the Supreme Court’s Ac-
tavis decision and its application of antitrust principles to the pay-for-delay agreements resulting from 
the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 123 See 1 JOHN J. MILES, HEALTHCARE & ANTITRUST LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE § 9.7 
(2014). 
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practices. It highlights the integration of technology into daily life and into 
businesses that were not previously highly technology-reliant, the development 
of new technologies that change the means of production, and the advent of 
PAEs who do not have a customer relationship and depend on a business mod-
el of suing thousands of end users. 
A. Identifying the End User 
End users may be plaintiffs taking proactive measures to invalidate a pa-
tent by seeking declaratory judgment124 or by challenging pay-for-delay 
agreements to obtain access to drugs.125 End users may also be defendants sued 
for infringing a patent126 or they may be threatened by litigation through cease 
and desist letters and choose to settle out of court.127 In some of these cases, 
end users may, in fact, be infringers.128 And in other cases, end users may be 
alleged infringers of patents that are invalid.129 End users may use a technolo-
gy for personal consumption or in business. Despite these variations, all end 
users differ from the traditional competitor in that they are not in the business 
of making or directly selling the technology at stake. They are strictly users. 
Even if they incorporate the patented technology within a product or service 
they offer their customers, they do not make or sell the technology itself, and 
therefore are usually not knowledgeable about it. At times, they may even be 
unaware of its existence. 
End users also differ in the equities of their cases. Some end users may 
advertently risk infringing a patent. For example, the farmers in Bowman v. 
Monsanto Co. knew that re-planting Monsanto’s patented seeds violated the 
contracts they signed with Monsanto and that Monsanto claimed that re-
                                                                                                                           
 124 See, e.g., Complaint, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, supra note 78, at 1; Complaint, 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, supra note 6, at 3–13. 
 125 See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1327, 1329–30 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (patients challenging an agreement between a patentee and generic drug manufacturer 
regarding the drug Cipro); In re Neurontin Antitrust Litig. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77475, at *2, *16 
(D. N.J. Aug. 28, 2009) (drug stores, such as Rite-Aid and CVS, challenging an agreement between a 
patentee and generic drug manufacturer regarding the drug Neurontin). 
 126 See, e.g., Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764–65 (2013); Complaint, Lodsys, 
LLC, supra note 98, at 1–2. 
 127 See, e.g., Mullin, supra note 95 (reporting that public transportation authorities sued by PAEs 
have preferred to settle quickly). 
 128 See, e.g., Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769 (holding that the farmers infringed Monsanto’s patent 
because the patent exhaustion doctrine does not apply to their actions). 
 129 See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111, 2120 
(2013) (invalidating certain breast cancer gene patent claims that were enforced against end users). In 
addition, many suits against end users are filed by PAEs who tend to enforce weak patents. See Alli-
son et al., supra note 50, at 693–94 (finding that PAE suits were much less likely than non-PAE suits 
to result in a ruling for the patentee). 
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planting the seeds amounts to patent infringement.130 At the same time, pod-
casters who purchased podcasting technology from those they believed were 
the legitimate owners of the technology were extremely surprised to find them-
selves sued by a PAE for patent infringement.131 Our sympathies are more like-
ly to lie with the innocent podcasters than with the savvy farmers. Yet, regard-
less of the equities of the cases and where our sympathies lie, all end users 
share certain characteristics that place them at a procedural disadvantage in the 
patent litigation arena. 
End users are often, although not always, small companies or individu-
als.132 Small entities are not new to the patent conflict zone. Traditionally, 
these small entities were technological companies with a sophisticated under-
standing of the patented technology and the relevant prior art. Often such a 
company develops a technology that another company seeks to patent. In these 
cases, the small technological entity may challenge the patent application in 
the PTO or may later contest the validity of the patent in court. In other cases, 
a patentee may sue a small technological company that is selling the technolo-
gy it developed.133 Regardless of these differences, small technological entities 
are in the business of making and selling, not just using the technology.134 
They, therefore, share a technological sophistication that facilitates challenging 
a patent application or the validity of an issued patent. In addition, these tech-
nological companies often become involved in the patent conflict early in the 
life of a patent when they realize a potential competitor has filed a patent ap-
plication or has received a patent and is entering the market. 
End users differ from these small technological companies in three re-
spects. First, end users lack technological sophistication. Their lack of techno-
                                                                                                                           
 130 Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1764–65. 
 131 See Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 4. 
 132 Examples of individuals as end users include patients suing in pay-for-delay cases or podcast-
ers threatened for use of podcasting technology. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 
F.3d 896, 899–900 (6th Cir. 2003) (patients challenging a pay-for-delay agreement); Press Release, 
Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 4 (a PAE enforcing a podcasting patent against podcasters). Exam-
ples of small businesses as end users include businesses sued or threatened for using scanning tech-
nology. See, e.g., Salzberg, supra note 5. Sometimes large businesses, such as Adidas, are the end 
users swept into a patent conflict. See Complaint, Lodsys, LLC, supra note 98, at 1. 
 133 In a famous recent example, Richard Ditzik lost his claim that Apple’s iPhone infringes his 
patent for a handheld device that combines computer and wireless-communication functions over both 
a Wi-Fi and cellular network. See Edvard Pettersson & Valerie Reitman, Apple Defeats Patent Claim 
Over Invention of Smartphone, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 26, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2013-11-25/apple-wins-patent-trial-brought-by-purported-smartphone-inventor.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/ZW49-WBL6. 
 134 Although, at times, small technological companies may use technologies they did not develop 
as a component in their own technology. In these cases they would be using the technology as end 
users. I am focusing here on technological companies that are involved in a patent conflict involving a 
technology they have developed. 
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logical sophistication puts them at a significant disadvantage in patent con-
flicts. While small companies that develop a technology have in-house engi-
neers who are acquainted with the technology and any related innovations, end 
users rarely have this know-how.135 End users are often individuals, such as 
patients, who lack any knowledge regarding the drug or test they seek to 
use.136 And even when individual end users, like farmers, use the patented 
technology in business, they are usually not technologically-savvy about the 
composition of the technology itself.137 The same applies to larger companies, 
such as Starbucks, who uses allegedly patented wireless technology in their 
business.138 
Technological sophistication is crucial in patent conflicts. Patent cases are 
decided based on the resolution of two main issues: patent validity and in-
fringement. Parties can challenge patent applications and issued patents’ validi-
ty on grounds of subject matter, novelty, non-obviousness, utility, and disclo-
sure.139 All challenges to patent validity require an intricate understanding of 
the technology at issue.140 In addition, challenges based on novelty, statutory 
bar, and non-obviousness, require an understanding not only of the technology 
at issue, but also of the prior art, which includes other related technologies in 
use, patents, patent applications, and publications.141 In-house engineers and 
developers usually have the knowledge and understanding of both the technol-
ogy they developed and the universe of relevant technologies and publica-
tions.142 Infringement arguments also depend on technological expertise and 
competitors’ in-house employees tend to have an in-depth understanding of the 
technology that facilitates making non-infringement arguments.143  
                                                                                                                           
 135 See Love & Yoon, supra note 1, at 1628–29 (discussing the in-house knowledge that techno-
logical competitors can rely on). 
 136 See, e.g., Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1327, 1329–30 (where 
patients challenged an agreement between patentee and generic drug manufacturer regarding the drug 
Cipro); Complaint, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, supra note 6, at 3–13 (where patients challenged 
the validity of Myriad’s BRCA1/BRCA2 patents). 
 137 See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1764–65 (discussing farmers who re-used Monsanto’s patented 
genetically engineered seeds). 
 138 See, e.g., Complaint for Patent Infringement at 4–15, Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC v. Starbucks 
Corp., No. 12-cv-3872 (N.D. Ill. 2012) [hereinafter Complaint, Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC] (alleging 
that Starbucks infringed Innovatio’s patent in wireless technology). 
 139 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2012) (providing grounds for invalidity). 
 140 For example, to challenge a patent under the disclosure requirement, the challenger needs to 
comprehend the way the technology operates and compare it to the description in the patent. See id. 
§ 112 (providing the disclosure requirement). 
 141 See id. §§ 102–103. 
 142 See Love & Yoon, supra note 1, at 1628–29 (discussing the in-house knowledge that techno-
logical competitors can rely on). 
 143 See id. (discussing manufacturers in PAE lawsuits). 
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Patent litigation is notoriously expensive, even for technological compa-
nies who can rely on in-house experts.144 Although all parties to the litigation 
often rely on outside experts, patent owners and competitors can do so to a 
lesser extent.145 The absence of in-house technological knowledge forces end 
users to depend on outside experts, which increases the cost of patent litiga-
tion. This increased cost makes settlement without resolving the merits of the 
claims particularly attractive.146 
Second, end users are unique in the stage in which they enter the patent 
conflict. End users do not manufacture the technology—they utilize it. They 
usually become embroiled in the patent conflict relatively late in the life of the 
patent. While competitors who manufacture and sell the technology and are 
well acquainted with the market may challenge the patent during the applica-
tion process or as it enters the market, end users enter the picture later. As us-
ers, their first contact with the patented technology is when it enters the mar-
ket, and often only when it achieves widespread adoption. Patented technolo-
gies frequently attain widespread adoption late in the life of the patent.147 The 
stage in which end users enter the conflict affects their opportunities to chal-
                                                                                                                           
 144 See infra notes 256–269 and accompanying text. 
 145 Technical experts may be testifying or non-testifying experts. See Bindu Donovan, Effective 
Selection and Retention of Testifying Experts for Patent Infringement Litigation, IP LITIGATOR, July–
Aug. 2013, at 1, 1, available at http://www.sidley.com/files/Publication/40030074-fe05-4901-8e2a-
ebd22a2f95de/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/52b81ea8-4cc3-453a-82e9-ece657f5cbd1/IPLIT_
070813_Donovan.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5BPE-J4CN. Non-testifying experts often play an 
important role. See id. at 2. They are instrumental in educating attorneys regarding the technology and 
assist in preparing validity or infringement arguments. See id. Law firm publications often recommend 
resorting to in-house counsels as experts. See, e.g., Mark L. Levine & Alan Littmann, Managing Patent 
Litigation: Successful Results at Reasonable Cost, BARTLIT, BECK, HERMAN, PALENCHAR, & SCOTT 
LLP (July 2009), http://www.bartlit-beck.com/about-news-118.html, archived at http://perma.cc/373H-
D7MR (recommending evaluating the patent and accused product as early as possible by relying on 
employees within the company); see also Alex Reese, Employee and Inventor Witnesses in Patent Trials: 
The Blurry Line Between Expert and Lay Testimony, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 423, 424–25 (2013), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2254996, archived at http://perma.cc/5UFP-
W2SC (explaining that parties often choose in-house witnesses such as employees or company founders 
rather than outside experts because of the added expense of relying on paid experts and the possibility 
that a paid expert my not completely agree with the litigant’s position); Edward G. Poplawski, Selection 
and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 145, 151–52 (1999) (discussing the strengths and 
weaknesses of using different parties as expert witnesses). 
 146 See James C. Yoon, Expanding the Customer Suit Exception in Patent Law, Presentation at 
the Stanford Law School Intellectual Property Scholar Conference, 17 (Aug. 9–10, 2012), available at 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/expanding-the-customer-suit-exception-in-28989/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FQ6H-PRXW. 
 147 See ROGERS, supra note 25, at 219–66 (discussing rates of adoption of new technologies and 
the factors affecting these rates). See generally Cotropia, supra note 25 (discussing the problem of 
patenting early in the technological cycle before the technology is ready for commercialization); 
Sichelman, supra note 25 (same). 
1466 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1443 
lenge the patent. Specifically, they are precluded from challenging the patent in 
the PTO during the application stage or soon thereafter. 
Finally, end users are typically one-time players. Manufacturers have high 
stakes in the resolution of the conflict because the patented technology is often 
central to their business.148 End users, however, are not in the business of man-
ufacturing or selling the alleged infringing technology. Instead, they are sur-
prised to find themselves involved in a patent dispute. In most cases the pa-
tented technology is ancillary to their business or may be substituted by other 
technologies on the market.149 As one-time players, they do not have an incen-
tive for a long-term resolution. Therefore, independent of the merits of the 
case, most end users will take the least costly option, which is often settlement 
or withdrawal from use of the technology.150 
B. The Traditional Competitor Model 
Patent law pays little attention to the end user. The utilitarian model driv-
ing patent law seeks to find a balance between incentivizing the inventor to 
promote innovation and preserving the public interest in access to new inven-
tions.151 Yet, patent law, in effect, places the competitor as the guardian of the 
public interest, assuming that in all cases the interests of the public and the 
competitor converge. The patent owner receives a twenty-year monopoly and 
typically a technologically-savvy competitor can challenge a patent application 
in the PTO or argue that the patent is invalid in court. Patent law presumes that 
the competitor’s business interest will motivate it to challenge invalid patents, 
thereby increasing public access to technology. 
Patent law doctrines, which regulate the patented innovation post market-
entry and are particularly relevant to user access, highlight patent law’s neglect 
of the end user. For example, both compulsory licensing and the doctrine of 
patent misuse focus on the actions of the patent owner and competitors to facil-
                                                                                                                           
 148 This was illustrated recently by the patent litigation known as the “Smartphone Wars.” See 
Agustino Fontevecchia, Smartphone Wars: Who Wins and Who Loses from the Apple-Samsung Patent 
Ruling, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2012, 4:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/08/27/
smartphone-wars-who-wins-and-who-loses-from-the-apple-samsung-patent-ruling, archived at http://
perma.cc/7HSF-R4MJ. 
 149 Though in some cases where the technology cannot be substituted and its expense is high, end 
users may be players with a long-term interest. For example, a group of Fabry (a genetic disease) 
patients asked the National Institute of Health (“NIH”) to use its march-in power to address a patented 
drug shortage. William O’Brien, March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act: The NIH’s Paper Tiger?, 
43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1403, 1405–06 (2013). In this case, the patients had no replacement and had 
a long-term interest in the production of the drug. See id.  
 150 See Yoon, supra note 146, at 19–20. 
 151 See David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Re-
stricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 182–83 (2009) (describing the utilitarian 
theory). 
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itate access through competition and price reduction.152 In the case of compul-
sory licensing, the behavior of the patentee instigates the issuance of a compul-
sory license. A compulsory license may be issued where the patent owner en-
gages in anti-competitive behavior, does not use the patent, refuses to license 
to a dependent patent that cannot be used without infringing the patent, or acts 
in a way that harms the public interest.153 The law then turns to the patentee’s 
competitor to resolve the dissemination and access problem. By compelling the 
patentee to license to competitors, the law seeks to accomplish increased pro-
duction of the invention, which will lower prices and result in increased dis-
semination and access.154 Although the goal is promoting user access, patent 
law provides the user no active role. 
Similarly, the patent misuse doctrine is triggered when the patentee takes 
unfair advantage of its patent rights,155 such as when the patentee engages in 
discriminatory licensing (charging some licensees mores than others).156 Patent 
misuse can be raised as a defense in patent infringement cases. In these cases, 
the law focuses on the acts of the patent owner who has taken unfair advantage 
of the patent, and resolves the problem by turning to the competitors, absolv-
ing them from liability for patent infringement.157 By defining the patentee’s 
behavior as patent misuse and preventing the patentee from enforcing the pa-
tent, courts strengthen the market power of competitors, assuming that compe-
tition will lower prices and increase public access. Again, although their inter-
ests are clearly at stake, patent law does not provide users an active role.158 
C. Reasons for the Change Toward a Hybrid Competitor-User Model 
The proliferation of some, although not all cases involving end users, can 
be explained as a result of changes in technology and patent litigation practic-
es. Two technological trends contributed toward making the end user a player 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See Gaia Bernstein, Incentivizing the Ordinary User, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1275, 1282–87 (2014).  
 153 Id. at 1282. Although compulsory licenses are quite rare in the United States, through its treaty 
obligations and a combination of statutory obligations, the United States may, and at times does, issue 
some version of a compulsory license in all categories, excluding the purpose of exploiting a depend-
ent patent. Id. at 1284–85.  
 154 See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 13–14, 66, 
78 (1977); Bernstein, supra note 152, at 1285–86. 
 155 Bernstein, supra note 152, at 1288; see 6 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 18.1 
(4th ed. 2012). Although courts and the legislature have greatly constricted the patent misuse defense 
through the years, certain actions by the patent owners are still considered misuse. See HERBET 
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.2 (2d ed. 2010) (describing the historical demise of patent misuse). 
 156 See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. 9, 16–17 (D. Alaska 1965) (finding discrim-
inatory licensing rates of shrimp peeling machinery to constitute patent misuse). 
 157 Bernstein, supra note 152, at 1286–87. 
 158 Id. 
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in patent litigation: the integration of technology into previously non-
technological functions of daily life and changes in the means of production 
that transformed users into producers. These technological trends took place at 
the same time as the exponential growth in PAE lawsuits that popularized 
threats and legal action against users who are customers. 
1. Technological Changes 
First, in the last decade, technology has further integrated into everyday 
life, becoming part of businesses and daily functions that previously did not 
require use of technology.159 For example, we traditionally did not view cafes 
as businesses that rely much on technology. Now, however, many cafes offer 
wireless services to their customers. Innovatio, a PAE, sued Starbucks Cafés 
for offering their customers wireless communications allegedly containing In-
novatio’s patented technology.160 Similarly, Adidas America, a sportswear 
manufacturer,, can no longer rely solely on its physical stores for sales. Like 
many other non-technology companies, it relies on sales through its website. 
Lodsys, another PAE, sued Adidas for alleged use of its patented technology in 
its website’s customer surveys and chat rooms.161 
Second, new genres of technologies are changing the means of produc-
tion, blurring the line between users and producers of technologies. Conse-
quently, patentees are increasingly targeting users as defendants in patent liti-
gation. This transformation is similar to the changes in the means of produc-
tion of creative works that took place over a decade ago. As content became 
digitized on the Internet, users could easily make copies of copyrighted works 
and create their own versions.162 As the means of production of copyrighted 
works changed, copyright owners began targeting users as defendants in copy-
right litigation.163 
One way in which the modes of production are currently changing is the 
advent of self-replicating technologies.164 Certain technologies can replicate 
themselves thereby transforming users into inadvertent producers of technolo-
                                                                                                                           
 159 See generally, e.g., GERARD GOGGIN, CELL PHONE CULTURE: MOBILE TECHNOLOGY IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE (2006) (describing how cell phone technology is integrated into many aspects of 
life). 
 160 See, e.g., Complaint, Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, supra note 138, at 3–15 (alleging that Star-
bucks infringed Innovatio’s patented wireless technology). 
 161 See Complaint, Lodsys, LLC, supra note 98, at 4, 6. 
 162 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
299–300 (1996) (describing the digitization of materials on the Internet). 
 163 See generally Hughes, supra note 11 (discussing the music industry’s lawsuits against indi-
viduals who downloaded music on the Internet). 
 164 See Sheff, supra note 73, at 230 (discussing Monsanto’s self-replicating seeds in the context of 
other self-replicating technologies, such as nanorobots or organic computers). 
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gy.165 In Bowman, Monsanto’s genetically engineered seeds could self-replicate. 
Farmers could purchase seeds once and save some of the crops to re-plant in 
subsequent seasons.166 The patent exhaustion doctrine grants users of a patented 
article the right to use or sell the article. But, it does not allow users to reproduce 
the article.167 Therefore, users of self-replicating technologies are exposed to 
litigation threats and lawsuits. 
Another transformation in the means of production that is likely to ex-
pand the role of the user is the introduction of the 3D printer. 3D printers can 
replicate three-dimensional products and have gone beyond being merely an 
expensive curiosity.168 UPS has started providing these printers in its stores for 
customers to use and Staples sells them for approximately $1300.169 3D print-
ers transform the access to the means of production by allowing consumers the 
opportunity to make items at home.170 This new capability makes it more like-
ly that an individual or a small business will make an infringing item that will 
expose them to patent liability.171 
2. Changes in Patent Litigation Practices 
PAEs have become an integral part of the patent litigation landscape.172 In 
2012, PAEs brought the majority of all patent lawsuits in the country.173 Unlike 
the traditional patentee-plaintiff, the PAE, is a non-practicing entity. It accrues 
revenues by purchasing patents and demanding licensing fees from those mak-
                                                                                                                           
 165 See id. at 242 (“Self-replicating technologies don’t merely teach competitors how to practice a 
new invention, they supply such competitors with a factory as well.”). 
 166 Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1764–65. 
 167 Id. at 1766. 
 168 Doherty, supra note 12, at 353–54. For further discussion on the advent of the 3D printers, see 
generally Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of Bits 
and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553 (2014); Lucas S. Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and the Public: 
Three-Dimensional Printing Technology and the Arts, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 811, 812 (2014). 
 169 Desai & Magliocca, supra note 13, at 10; see Doherty, supra note 12, at 357 (describing the 
market adoption of 3D printers). 
 170 See id. at 8, 11–13. 
 171 Doherty, supra note 12, at 358–59. 
 172 See Litigations Over Time, supra note 80 (showing the dramatic increase in PAE lawsuits 
from 2004 onward). 
 173 Mark Lemley and Douglas Melamed explain that because PAEs tend to sue multiple defendants 
in a single suit it is important to focus on the number of assertions, i.e., number of defendants sued. Lem-
ley & Melamed, supra note 82, at 2119 n.13. Colleen Chien reported that in 2012 PAEs were responsible 
for 57% of suits and 53% of assertions. Colleen Chien & Aashish R. Karkanis, Functional Claiming and 
Software Patents, (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 6-13, 2013), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2215867, archived at http://perma.cc/5CLR-DUL6; see 
also Sara Jeruss et al., The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, (UC Hastings 
Research Paper No. 45, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247195, 
archived at http://perma.cc/X3PF-HKKE (reporting that PAEs filed 58.7% of the patent lawsuits in 2012 
compared to 24.6% in 2007). 
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ing and using technology allegedly covered under its patents.174 The PAE 
model differs from the traditional patent litigation model and this distinction 
accounts for large numbers of end users being pulled into the heart of the pa-
tent conflict zone. 
One important difference between the traditional model and the PAE 
mode of operation is that many PAEs base their business on casting a broad net 
to demand licensing fees from thousands of alleged infringers.175 They demand 
licensing fees through infringement letters that are sent to hundreds or thou-
sands of users. Often PAEs make money by accumulating low settlement fees 
from many users.176 And although most cases end in settlements, some proceed 
to litigation. When in court PAEs tend to pursue a large number of alleged in-
fringers instead of focusing on one manufacturer or supplier.177 
The second important characteristic of this PAE model is that it does not 
discriminate between potential defendants. PAEs do not commercialize inven-
tions, compete in the marketplace, or have customers.178 As a result, PAEs are 
free to target major manufacturers/suppliers and users alike. Although the tra-
ditional patentee-plaintiff often refrains from suing competitors’ customers 
because they may one day become its own customers, the PAE is not similarly 
restrained. The end result is PAE lawsuits against users who are customers on a 
grand scale.179 
III. THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT AND THE END USER 
Advocates of the AIA hailed the patent statutory reform as a victory for 
the interests of small businesses. They claimed that the AIA will “protect small 
business patent holders from harassment by infringers,”180 “reduce fees for 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 458 (2012) (pointing to 
the general belief that PAEs are patent plaintiffs who do not produce a product or sell a service); Col-
leen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of 
High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1578 (2009) (defining PAEs as a “corporate patent en-
forcement entity that neither practices nor seeks to commercialize its inventions”).  
 175 See Chien & Reines, supra note 1, at 8–10 (explaining that the economics of these suits favors 
large pools of potential targets). 
 176 See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 82, at 2126 (describing this as one PAE business model). 
 177 PAEs join as many alleged infringers as possible in one lawsuit and file multiple lawsuits. 
After the AIA limited the number of defendants that can be joined, the number of lawsuits filed by 
PAEs’ has grown. See Bryant, supra note 83, at 691–92, 695–96 (describing PAE’s strategy of joining 
multiple unrelated defendants and the impact of the AIA joinder provision on the number of defend-
ants in PAE lawsuits). 
 178 See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 82, at 2126–29 (describing three patent troll business 
models). 
 179 Chien & Reines, supra note 1, at 8–11 (discussing PAE lawsuits against multiple customers). 
 180 Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, The America Invents Act: Promoting American Innova-
tion, Creating American Jobs, Growing America’s Economy, available at http://www.leahy.senate.
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small business patent applicants,”181 and “eliminate interference proceedings, 
which are often costly to small businesses.”182 The media frequently echoed 
these sentiments.183 
Small entities, however, differ significantly from end users. This Part 
shows that the AIA envisaged a technologically-savvy business competitor of 
the patentee or the patent applicant, that is well acquainted with the technology 
at issue and the relevant prior art, and often becomes involved in the patent 
conflict early in the life of the patent. As this Article has illustrated, the end 
user is a different creature. 
As part of the AIA’s overhaul of the Patent Act, the AIA created three new 
PTO procedures to replace the inter partes reexamination procedure: post-
grant review, inter partes review, and the covered business method patent re-
view.184 In addition, the AIA overhauled the third party submission procedure 
and broadened the prior user rights defense.185 Regardless of whether the AIA 
benefits small businesses, its amendments largely do not aid end users. End 
users are unlikely to be able to take advantage of the AIA’s reforms because 
they lack technical expertise and are usually exposed to the technology at a 
later stage. 
A. The AIA’s Overhaul of PTO Procedures 
Supporters of the AIA argued that small entities would benefit from the 
creation of new PTO procedures that will serve as an efficient and less costly 
                                                                                                                           
gov/imo/media/doc/PRESS-GoodForSmallBusiness-OnePager-FINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/U9AW-G4WB. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id.; see Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 454–55 (2012) (describing Senators Coons and Klobucher’s statements regard-
ing the expense of interference proceedings for small inventors). 
 183 See, e.g., John Koenig, The America Invents Act Is Better for Small Business, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 
2011), http://johnkoenig.com/the-america-invents-act-is-better-for-small-business/, archived at http://
perma.cc/5W9P-FLVV (mentioning reduced fees for small entities and the potential of challenging pa-
tent applications without legal representation). Academics and commentators also debated the impact of 
the AIA on small businesses. See generally, e.g., David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the 
Next Apple? The America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517 (2013) (arguing, 
based on the Canadian experience that a first-to-file system will harm individual inventors); Steve 
Moore, The AIA: A Boon for David or Goliath? (Part 1), IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 15, 2013, 7:45 AM), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/08/15/the-aia-a-boon-for-david-of-goliath/id=44651/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/V8GH-4FFU (assessing the impact of the AIA and arguing that despite its promises it has 
not benefitted small entities); Steve Moore, The AIA: A Boon for David or Goliath? (Part 2), IPWATCH-
DOG (Aug. 16, 2013, 10:39 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/08/16/aia-david-goliath-2/id=
44661/, archived at http://perma.cc/YL5R-QLDP (same). 
 184 See infra notes 206–218 and accompanying text. 
 185 See infra notes 198–205, 231–238 and accompanying text. 
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alternative to litigation. Patent litigation is exorbitantly expensive.186 These costs 
dissuade many (especially small) companies from pursuing litigation.187 The 
pre-AIA PTO alternative to litigation—the inter partes reexamination proceed-
ing—failed to serve as an effective option.188 The process was lengthy as it gen-
erally lasted a minimum of three years.189 Challengers could contest the patent 
only on Section 102 (novelty and statutory bar) and Section 103 (non-
obviousness) grounds.190 Furthermore, they could not fully participate in the 
process because they were only allowed a single response to a patentee’s fil-
ings.191  
Although challengers were limited in their ability to participate in the 
proceedings; they were also bound by strong estoppel provisions. First, chal-
lengers were estopped from challenging the validity of any fact determined 
during reexamination.192 Second, challengers were estopped from later assert-
ing the invalidity of the patent on any ground that was raised or could have 
been raised during reexamination.193 Consequently, challengers rarely used 
inter partes reexaminations.194 
The AIA replaced inter partes reexamination with three new proceedings: 
1) post-grant review, 2) inter partes review, and 3) covered business method pa-
tent review. In addition, it amended the third party submission process to facili-
tate interested parties’ ability to challenge patent applications. Supporters of 
these new procedures argued that small companies, for whom the cost of litiga-
                                                                                                                           
 186 See infra notes 256–269 and accompanying text; see also Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, 
Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors 
and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 948–49 (2004) 
(reporting the average costs of patent litigation and the discovery process). Additional costs of litiga-
tion may include higher royalties imposed on alleged infringers by the patentee as a penalty for refus-
ing to settle early. See id. at 954–55. Those challenging patent validity may also be enjoined from 
selling their products or be required to pay substantial damages. See Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant 
Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the America Invents Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 
110–11 (2011). 
 187 See Carrier, supra note 186, at 110. 
 188 See id. at 113–14 (discussing failings of the inter partes reexamination procedure); U.S PA-
TENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION 6–8 (2004), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexam_report.htm#_ftnl, archived 
at http://perma.cc/5GSP-ATH7 (analyzing inequities contained within the inter partes reexamination 
procedure). 
 189 Lawrence A. Stahl & Donald H. Heckenberg, The Scope and Ramifications of the New Post-
Grant and Inter Partes Review Proceedings at the USPTO, FITZPATRICK, CELLA, HARPER & SCINTO 
1–2, http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/Fitz_PTO_1_4_8.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3MFV-HRZM (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 190 Carrier, supra note 186, at 113–14. 
 191 Id. at 114. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
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tion and the long discovery process often renders litigation infeasible, would 
particularly benefit from these options.195 Others argued that these changes 
would not benefit small entities.196 Regardless, the small entities envisioned by 
both supporters and opponents are competitors who, unlike end users, are tech-
nologically-savvy. The goal of these procedures was to bring more information 
to the system by taking advantage of the knowledge of competitors who are best 
acquainted with the prior art and can best challenge the patent applicant’s affida-
vits and declarations.197 Although competitors are likely to be aware of the pa-
tent application and become involved during the application stage, end users are 
less likely to benefit from these procedures because they lack the technological 
know-how, and are unlikely to be implicated in the patent conflict at the time 
periods when the patent can be most effectively challenged. 
1. Third Party Submission 
Critics of the patent system often point to the PTO’s inability to properly 
examine the growing number of patent applications as a main cause for the 
outpouring of low quality patents. Over-burdened PTO examiners who may 
not be very familiar with the technology at issue are often unable to locate all 
the relevant prior art.198 To address this, Congress created the procedure of 
third party submission. The goal was to assist the PTO in obtaining the rele-
vant prior art to assess whether a patent meets the requirements of Sections 
102 and 103 of the Patent Act. Through the third party submission procedure, 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See Patent Quality Improvement: Post-Grant Opposition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 37 (2004) 
[hereinafter Patent Quality Improvement Hearing] (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, 
American Intellectual Property Law Association) (“I think that the fact that we can provide an attrac-
tive procedure that would determine the validity of claims of issued patents more efficiently, more 
effectively, quicker, than District Court litigation, which, as I noted, runs into the millions of dollars, 
is going to help large and small companies but especially the small company and the independent 
inventor.”); see also Changes to Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,164 (July 17, 2012) (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 41) (stating that the anonymity added to the third party submission procedure will 
encourage small entities to submit without fear of retaliation from a large competitor); Carrier, supra 
note 186, at 116–19 (focusing on the post-grant proceeding). 
 196 See, e.g., Jason Rantanen et al., Debate, America Invents, More or Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 229, 241–45 (2012), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/160-U-Pa-L-Rev-
PENNumbra-229.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UG7Z-SB7W (arguing that the post-grant review 
procedure would be harmful for small entities). 
 197 See Carrier, supra note 186, at 116. 
 198 See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating 
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 733 (2004) (describing the limitations that constrain patent 
examiners). 
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the PTO could rely on the expertise of the public to provide the examiner with 
relevant prior art documents.199 
The AIA’s goal in reforming the third party submission procedure was to 
enhance the public’s access to the procedure.200 Congress made changes to fa-
cilitate the procedure generally and, specifically, to facilitate the access of 
small entities. First, the period of time during which a third party could submit 
prior art was extended. Under the AIA, a third party can submit a patent, patent 
application or other printed application, as long as it is submitted before the 
earlier of (1) the date of notice of allowance; or (2) the later of: six months 
from the publication of the application or the date of the first rejection by an 
examiner.201 Second, prior to the AIA, third parties could submit prior art doc-
uments, but could not explain their relevance. Under the AIA, the third party 
submission should be accompanied by a description of relevance.202 
Congress incorporated two additional changes targeted specifically at im-
proving access for small entities. First, under the AIA, parties can participate 
anonymously in the third party submission procedure. Anonymity was not 
available under the previous law. The promoters of the law hoped that this will 
encourage small entities to submit without fear of retaliation if they have a 
valuable relationship with a larger applicant.203 Secondly, the AIA instituted 
lower fees for small entities.204 
Changes facilitating small entities’ access to third party submission may 
be helpful for small entities who are business competitors. They are knowl-
                                                                                                                           
 199 See Baumeister, supra note 20, at 387–88 (the public would provide the PTO with public 
documents that in an ideal world the examiner could find on his own); see also David J. Kappos, In-
vesting in America’s Future Through Innovation: How the Debate Over the Smart Phone Patent Wars 
(Re)Raises Issues at the Foundation of Long-Term Incentive Systems, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 485, 
493–94 (2013), https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-review-
stlr/online/investinginamericasfuture.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/45W6-S5YL (discussing this 
purpose in the context of software patents). 
 200 The procedure was infrequently used. In 2007, for every five hundred patent applications 
published, the PTO received only one third party submission. William Alsup, Memo to Congress, A 
District Judge’s Proposal for Patent Reform: Revisiting the Clear and Convincing Standard and Cal-
ibrating Deference to the Strength of the Examination, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1647, 1653 (2009). 
 201 35 U.S.C. § 122(e) (2012). This amends the previous law, which limited the time period to 
two months after publication or mailing of notice of allowance, whichever was earlier. Changes to 
Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the Leahy-Smith America In-
vents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,150 (July 17, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 41). 
 202 35 U.S.C. § 122(e); Changes to Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Pro-
vision of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,150. 
 203 Changes to Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,150, 42,164. 
 204 Currently, a small entity pays $90 and a micro entity pays no fees for third party submission. 
United States Patent and Trademark Office Fee Schedule, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/832N-EFD5 (last 
updated Oct. 1, 2014). 
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edgeable about the technology at issue and can locate relevant documents of 
prior art to submit. End users, however, are unlikely to possess this knowledge 
without relying on expensive outside sources. But most importantly, third party 
submission occurs very early in the life of the patent, even before the notice of 
allowance. At that point, business competitors may realize that a patent appli-
cation has been submitted and want to prevent the issuance of a patent. End 
users, however, are unlikely to be aware of the patent application and the rele-
vance of the technology because in most cases the invention has not yet 
reached the market.205 Therefore, end users are unlikely to avail themselves of 
the third party submission procedure, despite the AIA induced changes. 
2. Post-Grant Review 
The AIA instituted the post-grant review to replace the ineffective inter 
partes reexamination as a less expensive and more efficient forum than litiga-
tion to challenge a patent after its issuance.206 To reduce costs and increase 
efficiency, the AIA charged the newly formed Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(PTAB) to perform post-grant reviews and issue a final determination within a 
year, with a possibility of a six-month extension.207 In addition, the AIA im-
posed restrictions on post-grant review discovery to limit its scope and its cost 
as compared to patent litigation.208 
A petitioner can only file a post-grant review petition within a narrow 
time window—from the time a patent is granted or a reissue patent is issued to 
nine months after that date.209 The nine-month window requires petitioners to 
act quickly to take advantage of the broad grounds available to challenge a 
patent under the post-grant review.210 A post-grant review petitioner can re-
quest cancellation of patent claims on any ground under Sections 101, 102, 
                                                                                                                           
 205 For discussions of the problem of patenting early in the technological cycle before the tech-
nology is ready for commercialization, see generally Cotropia, supra note 25; Sichleman, supra note 
25. 
 206 See De Corte et al., supra note 20, at 126; see also Susan J. Marsnik, Will the America Invents 
Act Post-Grant Review Improve the Quality of Patents? A Comparison with the European Patent 
Office Opposition, in THE CHANGING FACE OF US PATENT LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON BUSINESS 
STRATEGY 183, 186 (Daniel R. Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswald eds., 2013) (“For years, scholars, practi-
tioners and government bodies have advocated instituting post-issuance administrative trial proceed-
ings at the PTO to determine validity more efficiently than litigation.”). 
 207 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11) (2012); see Paul M. Janicke, Overview of the New Patent Law of the 
United States, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 63, 70–71 (2013) (describing the time limitations of the 
post-grant review procedure). 
 208 See 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(5) (limiting discovery to evidence directly related to factual assertions 
advanced by either party); De Corte et al., supra note 20, at 127–29 (explaining that discovery in post-
grant proceedings is much more limited than in U.S. patent litigation). 
 209 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). 
 210 De Corte et al., supra note 20, at 123–24. 
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103, and 112. These include prior art anticipation (novelty and statutory bar), 
obviousness, lack of utility, lack of patent subject matter and failure to meet 
the requirements of definiteness, written description, and enablement.211 
Although, many commentators and legislators believed that the post-grant 
review would benefit small entities,212 the small entities that may benefit from 
the post-grant review procedure are, again, business competitors and not end 
users. First, as explored, end users are likely to become involved in a patent 
conflict only later in the life of the patent, long after the narrow post-grant re-
view window closes. Second, although post-grant review is designed to be less 
costly than litigation, estimates indicate that filing fees combined with attor-
ney’s fees are likely to bring the cost to approximately half a million dollars.213 
This cost is likely to be even higher for end users who cannot rely on in-house 
expertise. Finally, end users, who are often one time participants in the patent 
landscape, are unlikely to pursue conflict at the cost of half a million dollars or 
more in legal fees. 
3. Inter Partes Review 
The AIA designed the inter partes review as a less expensive and poten-
tially more effective alternative to litigation.214 As with the post-grant review, 
the AIA limited the duration of the proceeding. Inter partes review should be 
completed within one year though it can be extended by an additional six 
months.215 The scope of discovery is also more limited than discovery in fed-
eral court patent litigation.216 
                                                                                                                           
 211 See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b); De Corte et al., supra note 20, at 121. 
 212 See, e.g., Patent Quality Improvement Hearing, supra note 195, at 37 (statement of Michael 
Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association); Carrier, supra note 186, 
at 118. 
 213 Patent office fees are currently, a filing fee of $12,000, plus a fee of $250 for each claim over 
$20, and a post-institution fee of $18,000 plus a fee of $550 for each claim over 15. Fee Schedule, 
supra note 204. The PTO estimated the costs of attorney’s fees for the procedure based on the and the 
number of hours to prepare for various stages in the proceedings the AIPLA mean private firm attor-
ney fee of $371. See Marsnik, supra note 206, at 22. 
 214 See generally Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Defer-
ence for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013) (arguing that the creation of post-grant re-
view and inter partes review appoints the PTO instead of the courts as the interpreter of the core pa-
tentability standards). 
 215 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). 
 216 Id. § 316(a)(5); see Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, IPR2012-00001, 2013 
WL 2023626, at *2–4 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2013) (clarifying the scope of routine discovery and addi-
tional discovery in an inter partes review proceeding); Andrei Lancu et al., Challenging Validity of 
Issued Patents Before the PTO: Inter Partes Reexam Now or Inter Partes Review Later?, 94 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 148, 154–55 (2012) (describing the scope of limited discovery in inter 
partes review and arguing that it mainly favors patentees). 
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Inter partes review, in essence, continues where the post-grant review 
leaves off. Parties may challenge patent claims under inter partes review once 
the window to challenge them under the post-grant review closes.217 But, under 
inter partes review, unlike post-grant review, parties may challenge the validity 
of the patent only under Sections 102 and 103 (prior art and obviousness) and 
only on the basis of patents and prior patent applications.218 Thus, nine months 
after the grant of the patent, a party can no longer challenge it in the PTO 
based on many of the grounds available during post-grant review. These in-
clude challenges based on lack of utility, lack of patent subject matter and fail-
ure to meet the requirements of definiteness, written description, and enable-
ment. Additionally, parties can no longer challenge the novelty and non-
obviousness of the patent based on use or publications. 
Inter partes review, on the one hand, appears more suitable for end users 
because parties may challenge the patent at a later point in time after its issu-
ance. Parties can challenge the patent in an inter partes review from nine 
months after its issuance to the time it expires. During this period, end users 
are more likely to be utilizing the patented technology, and therefore, find 
themselves implicated in a patent dispute. At the same time, the scope of inter 
partes review is extremely narrow. By the time the end user can actually avail 
himself of a PTO proceeding its options are quite limited. Furthermore, the end 
user remains, in many cases, a one-time player who would prefer to settle or 
switch technologies rather than incur the costs of a PTO proceeding, which are 
particularly onerous for the end user. 
4. Covered Business Method Patent Review 
The AIA also designed a new eight-year transitory covered business meth-
od patent review process that went into effect on September 16, 2012 and is to 
be applicable only to petitions filed on or by September 16, 2020.219 Congress 
intended this proceeding, like the other PTO proceedings, to provide a less costly 
                                                                                                                           
 217 35 U.S.C. § 311(c) (allowing a petition for inter partes review to be filed after the later of 
either (1) the date that is nine months after the grant of a patent; or (2) if a post-grant review was insti-
tuted, the date of the termination of that review); see Jeffrey P. Kushan, The Fruits of the Convoluted 
Road to Patent Reform: The New Invalidity Proceedings of the Patent and Trademark Office, 30 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 405 (2012) (describing the timing relationship between post-grant review 
and inter partes review). 
 218 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (limiting the grounds for challenging a patent’s validity in inter partes 
review); see De Corte et al., supra note 20, at 121 (explaining that the grounds for challenging a patent 
are much narrower under inter partes review than under post-grant review). 
 219 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18 (a)(2) & (3)(A), 125 Stat. 
284, 330 (2011) (codified in scattered provisions of 35 U.S.C. (2012)). 
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alternative to litigation.220 The AIA and PTO final rules reflect that the procedure 
is to apply to a broad definition of business methods for financial products, in-
cluding “a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or 
other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a finan-
cial product or service.”221 The legislative history indicates that this procedure is 
not intended to be limited to patents covering specific financial products or ser-
vices and instead also covers ancillary activities related to financial services or 
products.222 Some interpretations of the covered business method review assert 
that it also applies to patents that involve “every-day business applications.”223 
And multiple bills are seeking to expand its scope further.224 Preliminary evi-
dence from the first hundred covered business method patent petitions demon-
strates that the PTO has broadly interpreted the scope of patents that can be re-
viewed under the procedure.225 
Petitioners may request a covered business method review from the time 
the post-grant review window closes until the patent expires.226 Generally, a 
petitioner can raise most grounds for challenging a patent under this proceed-
ing. Specifically, a petitioner challenging a patent filed under the first to file 
regime can challenge the patented business method under any ground, while 
those filing a petition to challenge a patent filed under the first to invent re-
gime are more limited in the scope of their challenges to certain challenges 
under Section 102 and 103.227 
Unlike the other AIA PTO proceedings, only a party that is sued or 
charged with infringement may petition for a covered business method review 
                                                                                                                           
 220 See Jeff Kettle, Congress Giveth and Taketh Away: A look at Section 18 of the America In-
vents Act and the Review of Business Method Patents, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 201, 214 
(2012). 
 221 See 35 U.S.C. § 18 (d)(1); see also Covered Business Method and Technological Invention 
Definitions Final Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,735 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 
42). However, it was not to apply to “technological inventions” defined as patents that claim a novel 
and unobvious technological feature that solves a technical problem using a technical solution. See 35 
U.S.C. § 18 (d)(1); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b) (2013) (defining “technological invention”). 
 222 See Joe Matal, A Guide to The Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 
FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 636–38 (2012). 
 223 See Kettle, supra note 220, at 209. 
 224 P. Andrew Riley et al., The Surprising Breadth of Post-Grant Review for Covered-Business-
Method Patents: A New Way to Challenge Patent Claims, 15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235, 262 
(2014) (describing various bills attempting to broaden the scope of the procedure). 
 225 Id. at 275–79. 
 226 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.303 (2013). 
 227 See Kettle, supra note 220, at 212–13; Matal, supra note 222, at 626–27. 
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of the patent.228 A party charged with infringement is a petitioner who would 
have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court.229 
Since covered business method review lasts until the patent expires, end 
users can take advantage of this process. The procedure will still be available 
at the time that they find themselves involved in the patent dispute.  
The covered business method review, however, is limited in significant 
ways, making it only a partial solution for end users. First, an end user who has 
not been sued or received a cease or desist letter cannot file a petition. Unlike 
competitors, there are usually large numbers of end users who are similarly situ-
ated. Once a patentee starts suing end users, others may fear they will be sued 
next or may want to take action to gain access to a patented technology that is 
crucial for them. Nonetheless, they would be precluded from taking preemptive 
action by filing for a covered business method review. Second, the procedure is 
temporary in nature and will sunset in six years.230 Therefore, it does not provide 
a long-term solution. Third, although broadly defined, this procedure does not 
apply to all categories of patents. At its broadest interpretation it may apply to 
patents on business method applications or to ancillary activities related to finan-
cial services or products. It does not apply to many of the lawsuits involving end 
users, particularly those involving drugs and medical tests. 
B. The AIA’s Expansion of the Prior User Rights Defense 
The prior user rights defense to patent infringement is afforded to a party 
that was commercially using an invention, which is later patented by another 
party. A party who successfully asserts the defense may continue to use the 
patented invention without paying licensing fees within certain restrictions.231 
Prior to the adoption of the AIA, the Patent Act provided a limited defense that 
applied only to business method patents.232 In addition, a party could raise the 
defense only if that party was the inventor who reduced the invention to prac-
tice.233 
The AIA’s expanded prior use defense now applies to all inventions and is 
not limited solely to business method patents.234 Third parties receive protec-
                                                                                                                           
 228 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18 (a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 284, 330 
(2011) (codified in scattered provisions of 35 U.S.C. (2012)); see also Kettle, supra note 220, at 213–
14 (comparing covered business method review standing to post grant review standing). 
 229 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). 
 230 125 Stat. at 830. 
 231 See KAPPOS & REA, supra note 29, at 5. 
 232 American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 § 4302(a), 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3), (b)(1) (2006) 
(repealed and replaced by 125 Stat. at 297–99). 
 233 Id. § 273(b)(1). 
 234 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012). 
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tion if they demonstrate that they were using the invention for at least one year 
prior to the filing date of a patent application or disclosure to the public.235 And 
importantly, the AIA does not contain a requirement that a party claiming the 
prior use defense needs to be the inventor who reduced the invention to prac-
tice. Instead, it applies to any party that commercially used the subject matter 
of the invention.236 
Some argued that prior user rights would benefit small businesses while 
others disagreed. Yet, the parties to the debate only envisioned the small inven-
tor or technology competitor. End users were not at the core of that debate.237 
And, while the AIA’s expansion of the prior user rights defense opens the door 
to some end users to avail themselves of the defense, it is unlikely to be fre-
quently used by end users. 
The elimination of the reduction to practice requirement would facilitate 
end users’ ability to take advantage of the prior user rights defense. To avail of 
the prior user rights defense, the end user needs to use the invention in com-
merce at least one year prior to the filing of the application or disclosure to the 
public. Some end users, in fact, use technologies in commerce, such as cafes 
offering wireless technology to their customers or mass transit systems offer-
ing train-tracking information to their passengers. And, end users may license 
or purchase a technology that is later patented by another. In most cases, how-
ever, end users do not have access to a technology early in its life cycle. This 
lack of early access to the technology makes it difficult for end users to utilize 
the defense.238 
                                                                                                                           
 235 Id. § 273(a)(2). 
 236 See id. § 273(a)(1) (providing that “[a] person shall be entitled to a defense . . . if (1) such 
person, acting in good faith, commercially used the subject matter in the United States, either in con-
nection with an internal commercial use or an actual arm’s length sale or other arm’s length commer-
cial transfer of a useful end result of such commercial use”); see also KAPPOS & REA, supra note 29, 
at 18 (stating that the AIA does not require the party asserting prior use rights to be the actual inven-
tor). 
 237 See Keith Kupferschmid, Prior User Rights: The Inventor’s Lottery Ticket, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 
213, 234 (1993) (noting benefits for small entities whose licensees could take advantage of prior user 
rights); see also KAPPOS & REA, supra note 29, at 39 (noting that the prior user rights defense could 
be important for small inventors who do not have the resources to get to the PTO first in a first-to-file 
system). But see Edward L. MacCordy, The Threat of Proposed Patent Law Changes to the Research 
University, 20 J.C. & U.L. 295, 303 (1994) (arguing that it would be impossible to tell whether a po-
tential infringer has prior user rights without expensive litigation that small businesses and independ-
ent inventors cannot afford). 
 238 Beyond the unsuitability of the defense to the circumstances of the end user, it appears that 
even in countries where the defense was extensively available, neither competitors nor end users tend-
ed to use it. See KAPPOS & REA, supra note 29, at 38. 
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IV. SHIFTING LEGAL FEES AS A TOOL IN END USER LITIGATION 
The recent patent reform under the AIA failed to consider the growing 
role of end users. Consequently, irrespective of whether end users’ claims are 
substantively justified, they currently lack the procedural tools to pursue their 
claims in patent litigation. This Part argues that a fee shifting regime that con-
siders the end user status, and increases the likelihood that a court would com-
pensate prevailing end users for their expenses, could help level the playing 
field for end users in a broad array of cases.  
Fee shifting is by no means the only procedural tool necessary to accom-
plish this leveling. Granting end users standing to sue in declaratory judgment 
cases would also be an important tool.239 In addition, some end users who are 
customers of manufacturers of the allegedly patented technology could resolve 
the problem through contractual indemnification obligations by the manufac-
turers. And another option for customer end users is a stay of the lawsuit 
against them, while the manufacturer and patentee are litigating the case, 
through the expansion of the customer suit exception.240 This Article, however, 
focuses on fee shifting because it is the one procedural tool that is applicable to 
all end user cases. And while the availability of fee shifting will only motivate 
some end users to litigate their meritorious claims, all categories of end users 
can potentially benefit from this remedy. 
This Part begins by presenting an overview of the American Rule regard-
ing fee shifting the current fee shifting regime under patent law, the costs of 
patent litigation and the rationales for and against fee shifting in litigation. 
Next, this Part examines recent legislative and Supreme Court activity regard-
ing fee shifting in patent litigation. It argues that the unique qualities and cir-
cumstances of end users make fee shifting particularly appropriate. Finally, this 
Part discusses the design and implementation of a fee shifting regime that ad-
dresses end users’ interests in patent litigation. 
A. The American Rule and the Patent System 
The American Rule governing legal fees differs from the rules prevalent 
in the majority of other jurisdictions. The traditional American Rule does not 
allow successful litigants to recover legal fees from the defeated party,241 while 
                                                                                                                           
 239 For my discussion of the issue of end users’ standing to sue for declaratory judgment of patent 
invalidity, see generally Bernstein, supra note 32. 
 240 See generally Love & Yoon, supra note 1 (discussing an expansion of the customer suit ex-
ception). 
 241 See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (“The general practice of the 
United States is in opposition to [the indemnity rule] and even if that practice were not strictly correct 
in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute.”). 
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the established rule in England and many other countries permits the prevailing 
party to collect reasonable attorney’s fees from the losing party.242 Congress, 
however, has frequently circumvented the default rule by enacting statutes that 
allow fee shifting to prevailing parties in certain situations,243 such as civil 
rights cases,244 fair housing cases,245 and consumer protection cases.246 In addi-
tion, certain states created exceptions to the American Rule. For instance, state 
courts in Alaska follow a loser pays rule.247 
These deviations from the American Rule follow different forms. Many 
federal statutes allow attorney fees to prevailing parties. Some authorize both 
plaintiffs and defendants to recover fees,248 while others only allow plaintiffs 
to recover fees.249 In addition, some statutes allow judges to grant fee 
awards,250 while other statutes require judges to grant fee awards.251 
Under the Patent Act, courts have the discretion to grant attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party, whether plaintiff or defendant, in exceptional circum-
                                                                                                                           
 242 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717–18 (1967) (de-
scribing the differences between the English Rule and the American Rule); Cubita et al., supra note 
35, at 188 (stating that the United States is the only common law jurisdiction where each party must 
bear the total expense of compensating his attorney). 
 243 See Silver, supra note 35, at 866 (“Fee shifting is common in federal cases” and that, by enact-
ing over 150 statutes entitling parties who prevail to claim fee awards, Congress greatly restricted the 
American Rule); see also Cubita et al., supra note 35, at 286–89 (describing federal statutes that au-
thorize awards of attorney’s fees to “prevailing parties”). 
 244 The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012) (“[T]he 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable at-
torney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”). 
 245 The Fair Housing Act § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p) (2012) (“[T]he administrative law judge or 
the court, as the case may be, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.”). 
 246 The Truth in Lending Act § 130, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2012) (providing that creditors could 
be liable to successful plaintiffs for the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee). 
 247 See, e.g., Alaska R. Civ. P. 82 (establishing a prevailing party fee shifting system in Alaska); 
see also Olson & Bernstein, supra note 51, at 1180–86 (describing the evolution of the Alaskan fee 
shifting rule). 
 248 Silver, supra note 35, at 872–73; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (allowing any prevailing party 
to receive attorney’s fees in a civil rights case); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 
421 (1978) (holding that a court may award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant (employer) in an 
employment discrimination suit under Title VII if it finds that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation even though not brought in bad faith). 
 249 Silver, supra note 35, at 873; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (allowing prevailing plaintiffs 
to receive attorney’s fees from creditors in consumer protection cases); The Fair Credit Reporting Act 
§ 616(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(c) (stating that liability to a prevailing consumer plaintiff could include 
attorney’s fees if a filing was made in bad faith or for purposes of harassment). 
 250 Silver, supra note 35, at 872; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2012) (providing judges with the 
discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in certain securities cases). 
 251 Silver, supra note 35, at 872; see, e.g., Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (mandating 
attorney’s fee awards in certain antitrust cases). 
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stances.252 Historically, the Federal Circuit narrowly interpreted the phrase 
“exceptional circumstances,” which made it difficult for prevailing parties to 
receive attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court, however, in its 2014 Octane Fit-
ness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. decision, relaxed the Federal Cir-
cuit’s strict interpretation.253 According to the Court, an exceptional case is 
simply a case that “stands out from others with respect to the substantive 
strength of a party’s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in 
which the case was litigated.”254 It explained that the district court should de-
cide whether a case is “exceptional” based on the totality of the circumstanc-
es.255 The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit standard as too rigid. 
Specifically, it held that fee shifting is not limited to cases involving miscon-
duct that usually extends to independently sanctionable conduct. It also held 
that the prevailing party no longer has to prove both that the litigation is objec-
tively baseless and that the plaintiff brought it in subjective bad faith. Instead, 
it could be sufficient to show subjective bad faith. Under this new standard 
articulated by the Supreme Court, district courts are more likely to award at-
torney’s fees in patent cases. 
B. The Costs of Patent Litigation 
Patent litigation is notoriously expensive. In 2013, the American Intellec-
tual Property Law Association (the “AIPLA”) reported that when less than one 
million dollars was at stake the mean for the total cost of the litigation was 
$968,000 (median cost was $700,000).256 The AIPLA also reported that when 
one to ten million dollars were at stake, the mean for the total cost of litigation 
was $2,100,000 (median was $2,000,000).257 In addition, when ten million to 
twenty-five million dollars were at stake the mean for the total cost of litiga-
tion was $3,354,000 (median was $3,325,000).258 Finally, the AIPLA reported 
that when more than twenty-five million was at stake the mean for the total 
                                                                                                                           
 252 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). 
 253 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2014) (“The 
framework established by the Federal Circuit . . . is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the 
statutory grant of discretion to district courts.”). 
 254 Id. at 1756. 
 255 Id. at 1756–58. 
 256 AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-129 (2013). The mean cost by the end of dis-
covery was $530,000 (median cost was $350,000). AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-129 
(2013). 
 257 Id. at I-130. The mean cost by the end of discovery was $1,229,000 (median cost was 
$1,000,000). Id. at I-129. 
 258 Id. at I-130. The mean cost by the end of discovery was $2,192,000 (median cost was 
$2,000,000). Id.  
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cost of litigation, was $5,911,000 (median was $5,500,000).259 Furthermore, in 
addition to direct litigation costs, studies show that there are indirect costs to 
defendant’s business such as diversion of resources, delays in new products, 
and loss of market share.260 Patent litigation expenses are particularly striking 
considering that only about eighty percent of patent cases settle.261 Five per-
cent of the cases go to trial, eight percent are terminated on the merits through 
a motion for summary judgment, and the remainder is disposed of through 
some form of non-merit disposition.262 
Fees to litigate a patent dispute are many times higher than those for other 
civil actions.263 To compare, civil litigation costs are generally much lower 
with median civil litigation costs for a plaintiff of $15,000 and $20,000 for a 
defendant.264 And although some reports indicate somewhat higher fees for 
certain categories of civil litigation, such as $43,000 median overall costs for 
automobile cases, $54,000 for premises liability, $66,000 for real property cas-
es, $88,000 for employment cases, $91,000 for contract cases, and $122,000 
for malpractice cases, these figures are still well below the costs of patent liti-
gation.265 
Certain characteristics that are unique to patent litigation contribute to its 
escalated costs. In general, the number of patent cases that go to trial is still 
relatively high compared to civil case. Patent cases take a longer period of time 
to resolve. The average time in high-volume patent venues is longer than two 
years.266 But of particular importance, unlike some other forms of litigation, 
patent infringement actions are rarely dismissed at the pleading stage. Courts 
hearing patent disputes conduct a special hearing called a Markman hearing to 
                                                                                                                           
 259 Id. at I-132. The mean cost by the end of discovery was $3,571,000 (median cost was 
$3,000,000). Id. at I-131. 
 260 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 387, 409 (2014) (focusing on NPE litigation). But cf. David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Essay, 
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 431–48 
(2014) (criticizing Bessen & Meurer’s study). 
 261 Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examina-
tion of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 259 (2006). 
 262 Id. at 258–59, 271–72, 311. 
 263 David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. 
L. REV. 335, 348 (2012).  
 264 See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil 
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 770 (2010). Older data also shows that the costs of other forms of civil 
litigation are much lower than patent litigation costs. See David M. Trubek et al., The Cost of Ordi-
nary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 92 (1983) (finding that the cost to litigate an average civil suit 
rarely exceeds $10,000). 
 265 Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, 20 
COURTS STATISTICS PROJECT 1, 7 (2013), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/micro
sites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csph_online2.ashx, archived at http://perma.cc/9CE-PGAY. 
 266 Schwartz, supra note 263, at 348. 
2014] The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation 1485 
interpret claims. Claims define the scope of the patent and are critical for the 
resolution of the case. Once the court determines the scope of the patent, the 
likely outcome of the case becomes much clearer.267 Courts experienced with 
patent litigation often schedule Markman hearings before trial but after signifi-
cant discovery. This resolves the issue of claim construction in the context of 
the litigated products or processes.268 At the same time, this means that the par-
ties incur significant expenses even if the suit is resolved before trial. Costs of 
patent litigation include attorney fees, expert witness fees, travel costs and 
document management and production costs.269 And another important reason 
that litigation is particularly expensive is that it often requires different experts 
to cover the industry, the particular technologies at issue, as well as experts to 
cover the damages issue.270 
These patent litigation expenses can be especially onerous for end us-
ers.271 Unlike technological competitors, end users do not usually have patent 
litigation insurance that can reduce their expenses.272 End users are unlikely to 
seek insurance coverage because most are not technological companies and 
therefore do not anticipate being swept into patent litigation. Furthermore, alt-
hough not all end users are necessarily small entities, many are, and studies 
                                                                                                                           
 267 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (deciding that judges 
must perform claim construction, which involves determining the proper scope and boundaries of the 
patent); Vincent P. Kovalick, Markman Hearings and Their Critical Role in U.S. Patent Litigation, 
FINNEGAN (Oct. 2009), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=9a8bf
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 269 Catherine Rajwani, Controlling Costs in Patent Litigation, HARBOR LAW GROUP (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.harborlaw.com/publications/jcb20106a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HHG4-9BQL. 
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See id. at 773 n.88 (mentioning intellectual property cases). Finally, even though the AIPLA statistics 
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AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY (2013). 
 272 See Rajwani, supra note 265, at 4 (mentioning patent litigation insurance as one of the top ten 
ways to reduce patent litigation costs). 
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reveal that litigation costs, whether direct or indirect, are particularly burden-
some for small companies.273 
C. The Fee Shifting Debate 
The prevalence of fee shifting as exceptions to the American Rule has in-
spired a rich debate regarding the rationales for and against it. The main argu-
ment in support of the American Rule is that universal fee shifting could deter 
parties with novel and uncertain claims from litigation because they will fear 
that they will end up paying for their opponent’s attorney’s fees as well as their 
own.274 In addition, commentators and courts have raised several concerns in 
support of the American Rule. First, they have pointed out that attorneys’ fees 
may become exorbitant if they could be shifted to the opponent.275 Second, 
they have argued that the extra time needed for hearings on attorneys’ fees 
would constitute a serious burden on the already congested judicial system.276 
And third, they have highlighted that lawyers may be unable to engage in ef-
fective independent advocacy when the judge before whom they argue deter-
mines their fees.277 
At the same time, commentators and legislators have put forth six main 
rationales for fee shifting.278 All are relevant to fee shifting in patent litigation, 
while four of these rationales are particularly relevant for end user patent liti-
gation, namely: inequality in party strength, the private attorney general theory, 
economic incentives, and the punitive function. 
First, commentators raise a fairness argument to justify fee shifting. 
Whether the winner is a defendant who was dragged into litigation or a plain-
tiff who had a valid claim, their litigation expenses were a result of the loser’s 
wrongful actions and they should be compensated.279 Second, commentators 
have noted that unless fee shifting occurs, the winning litigant will not be 
made financially whole. The winning litigant will be compensated only for his 
                                                                                                                           
 273 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 260, at 400. 
 274 Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 718; Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys’ Fees for 
Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C. L. REV. 613, 618 (1983). 
 275 See, e.g., Charles T. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Ele-
ment of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 639 (1931). 
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 278 See infra notes 279–294 and accompanying text. 
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. . . deserves compensation for having had to repulse an invalid claim . . . a plaintiff with a valid claim 
deserves [damages recognizing the legal fees] paid in defeating a recalcitrant defendant.”). 
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injuries, but may have incurred significant expenses during litigation that he 
has not recouped.280 Third, some commentators have noted that fee shifting 
can serve a punitive function. High litigation expenses can be a means of de-
terring or punishing misconduct, such as frivolous lawsuits.281 
Fourth, the private attorney general theory justifies a fee award on the ba-
sis of public usefulness.282 Litigation sometimes produces benefits beyond 
those reaped by the successful party. Other parties not represented in the law-
suit may benefit from the plaintiff’s victory. This type of litigation advances 
the public interest or at least a private interest broader than that represented by 
the actual parties. Without fee shifting the cost to a private party may exceed 
any gains it may receive. Thus, potential plaintiffs may refrain from bringing 
socially beneficial lawsuits.283 
Fifth, fee shifting can equalize the strength of the parties.284 One side in 
litigation may have superior resources, creating an inequality in power. This 
does not necessarily mean that a party does not have sufficient resources to 
hire a lawyer or that a party is impoverished. Instead, it means that the costs of 
hiring a lawyer may exceed the expected gain and, therefore, that party may 
find it uneconomical to proceed to litigation even if it has a meritorious argu-
ment.285 Legislatures have considered the relative strengths of parties, incorpo-
rating fee shifting provisions to govern suits against the government or suits 
brought by small or individual private parties.286 The Equal Access to Justice 
Act, for example, was enacted to correct the power imbalance when the federal 
government opposes an individual of moderate wealth or a small to moderate 
entity.287 It allows fee shifting for certain private parties who prevail in non-
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tort civil actions and administrative proceedings against the federal govern-
ment, if the government cannot show that its position was substantially justi-
fied or that there were other circumstances that make the award unjust.288 The 
legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 also 
indicates that the purpose of the Act was to enable private citizens with few 
resources to hire a lawyer knowing that they could recover the costs of their 
lawsuit.289And, as a final example, employees who usually have fewer re-
sources than employers can recover attorney fees in minimum wage, maximum 
hours and discrimination litigation.290 
Lastly, the most debated rationale concerns economic incentives. Fee 
shifting can encourage plaintiffs to pursue meritorious small claims and dis-
courage plaintiffs from pursuing weak claims. Fee shifting can also expedite 
litigation and prevent abuse of discovery processes.291 Additionally, a fee shift-
ing system can prevent parties from settling when they have meritorious argu-
ments just to avoid the costs of litigation.292 There appears to be a broad con-
sensus that a fee shifting system would reduce the number of nuisance suits 
and enable plaintiffs to bring some highly meritorious small lawsuits.293 Re-
searchers, however, disagree as to whether fee shifting would increase or de-
crease the rate of settlement.294 
D. The Fee Shifting Debate and Patent End User Litigation 
Overall, the fee shifting rationales strongly support fee shifting in patent lit-
igation involving end users. Although the fairness argument may be weaker in 
patent litigation, the inequality of power, attorney general, economic incentives 
and punitive function rationales make a compelling case for fee shifting where 
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end users are parties in patent litigation, whether as defendants or as plaintiffs in 
suits for declaratory judgment for patent invalidity. 
The fairness rationale, where the loser who is in the wrong should pay for 
the winner’s costs, is weaker when the outcome of the litigation is unpredicta-
ble.295 It is harder to penalize the loser for dragging the winner into court when 
at the outset or even throughout litigation that party appeared to have had a good 
chance of prevailing. Patent cases are considered particularly unpredictable 
compared to other forms of litigation. First, knowing the relevant facts before 
litigation begins is challenging in patent cases. To evaluate the validity of a pa-
tent one needs to know the entire universe of relevant prior art. Defendants are 
likely to work hard to locate any sources of prior art for trial. Therefore, it is hard 
to predict the likelihood that a patent will be found invalid before extensive dis-
covery.296 Second, significant uncertainty surrounds the court’s interpretation of 
the patent claims that define the scope of the patent.297 Even after the district 
court construes the claim, the appellate court reverses the claim construction at a 
rate of between thirty to forty percent.298 Thus, from a fairness perspective, the 
argument for shifting is less compelling in patent cases. 
At the same time, the other rationales support fee shifting in cases involv-
ing end users. First, fee shifting is particularly important when there is an imbal-
ance of power between the parties.299 Many end users, such as patients or small 
businesses, are entities of limited resources. But, fee shifting to reduce the power 
imbalance between parties also applies anytime the costs of hiring a lawyer may 
exceed the expected gains and, therefore, that party may prefer to settle or not 
sue even if it has a strong case.300 End users, who are not in the business of man-
ufacturing or selling a competing technology, tend to be one-time patent litiga-
tion participants. Thus, even if they have the financial resources and a meritori-
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ous claim, they may find it uneconomical to invest in patent litigation. Instead 
they would rather refrain from using the technology altogether or settle to pay a 
royalty. In addition, end users are in a weakened position due to their lack of in-
house technological expertise. 
Plaintiffs enforcing their patents can also take advantage of the growing 
market for contingent fee patent litigation.301 Since end users cannot avail them-
selves of this option the disparity between the parties’ financial prowess grows. 
The availability of fee shifting could help minimize the disparity between the 
strength of the parties and may also have an indirect effect of encouraging law-
yers to undertake contingent representation of defendants, including end users, 
which would further balance the playing field. 
Second, under the private attorney general theory, fee shifting can en-
courage plaintiffs to undertake litigation that advances a public interest or at 
least a private interest broader than that represented by the actual parties.302 
End users can be parties to patent litigation either as defendants accused of 
patent infringement or as plaintiffs, usually alleged infringers or potentially 
alleged infringers, initiating litigation by seeking a declaratory judgment of 
patent invalidity. Currently, there are significant disincentives for bringing de-
claratory judgment actions. These disincentives include the expense of the liti-
gation, lack of financial rewards for invalidating patents, and the risk of trig-
gering countersuits of infringement.303  
In addition, suits for declaratory judgments can be beneficial to many par-
ties who are not immediately before the court. In 1971, in Blonder-Tongue La-
boratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, the Supreme Court held that 
a patentee is estopped from enforcing a patent that has been held invalid against 
other entities that were not parties to the original litigation.304 Therefore, a de-
claratory judgment ruling benefits other accused infringers creating a collective 
action problem, which results in fewer challenges than are socially optimal.305 
For example, the lawsuit against Myriad for declaratory judgment to invalidate 
Myriad’s breast cancer gene patents could potentially benefit patients who were 
not among the plaintiffs by reducing prices and increasing patients’ access to 
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breast cancer genetic testing.306 Similarly, a successful lawsuit to invalidate a 
patent held by a PAE can prevent the PAE from suing other alleged infringers.307 
These disincentives make suits for declaratory judgment relatively rare in patent 
litigation.308 
Plaintiffs seeking declaratory judgments of patent invalidity are also un-
likely to use another litigation vehicle that enables the representation of a 
broader public interest—the class action. Although class actions can resolve 
the litigation cost problem and provide access to judicial relief for small 
claims, they also involve an important strategic drawback for alleged infring-
ers.309 Under Blonder-Tongue, a finding of patent invalidity prevents the pa-
tentee from enforcing the patent against other alleged infringers, but a finding 
of patent validity does not prevent another alleged infringer from challenging 
the patent in another proceeding.310 Because absent class members are bound 
by a finding of validity, there is a disincentive for class action, due to the risk 
that the court will find the patent valid and all class members, whether in court 
or not will be bound by this holding.311 
The disincentives for individual action for declaratory relief and the ab-
sence of class actions have prompted public interest organizations, such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union and the Public Patent Foundation, to undertake 
these lawsuits.312 Public interest organizations, however, can only take on a 
limited number of lawsuits. Adopting a fee shifting regime will increase the 
likelihood of individual defendants bringing declaratory judgment actions, 
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which benefits go beyond the immediate case. End users may also be particu-
larly suitable to bring declaratory judgment actions. 
Third, commentators generally agree that fee shifting is likely to reduce 
the filing of low merit claims and prevent abuse of discovery processes. There 
is disagreement, however, as to whether fee shifting will increase or decrease 
the likelihood of settlements. PAEs initiate many of the lawsuits against end 
users.313 They often sue customers of technological companies that manufac-
ture and sell the allegedly infringing technology.314 A main concern regarding 
PAE lawsuits against end users is that users are likely to settle even when they 
have meritorious claims.315 Yet, commentators, as noted, disagree whether fee 
shifting is likely to reduce the likelihood that a party will settle when it has a 
meritorious argument. At the same time, many commentators believe that PAE 
lawsuits enforce weak patents and needlessly harass users.316 Fee shifting 
could reduce the number of lawsuits brought by PAEs against end users be-
cause the risk would be higher for PAEs if they could end up paying the litiga-
tion expenses of thousands of defendants.317 The economic incentives rationale 
then provides additional support for fee shifting in end user cases because of 
the prevalence of PAE lawsuits. 
Finally, the pervasiveness of PAE lawsuits against end users also makes the 
punitive function of fee shifting relevant. Fee shifting can deter and punish mis-
conduct in litigation that is motivated by the knowledge that high litigation costs 
force parties into settling. Critics of PAE litigation highlight their abusive litiga-
tion practices and impact on innovation, underscoring the need to deter PAE 
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conduct.318 Fee shifting as a punitive measure appears then to be relevant at least 
to the subset of end user cases involving PAEs. 
E. Designing Fee Shifting to Address End Users’ Interests  
in Patent Litigation 
1. Current Legislative and Judicial Activity 
Presently, fee shifting in patent litigation is receiving significant atten-
tion.319 The Supreme Court decided two patent fee shifting cases in 2014320 
and Congress is considering multiple bills espousing different versions of fee 
shifting in patent litigation.321 The PAE crisis is driving this fee shifting de-
bate.322 Some proposed solutions target PAEs directly, while others offer a 
broader fee shifting approach. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions, along with some of the bills brought 
before Congress, focus on facilitating fee shifting generally without targeting 
PAEs specifically. Section 285 of the Patent Act provides that: “[t]he court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”323 
In 2014, in Octane Fitness v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., the U.S. Supreme 
Court lowered the standard for awarding fee shifting under Section 285 for all 
alleged infringers.324 Similarly, the Innovation Act, which has emerged as the 
leading bill in Congress, amends Section 285 to provide for fee shifting without 
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considering the identity of the parties. The Innovation Act contains an assump-
tion that attorney’s fees will be awarded to the prevailing party, unless the court 
finds that the position and conduct of the non-prevailing party are substantially 
justified or that special circumstances make the award unjust.325 
Other bills incorporate fee shifting measures that target PAEs, either di-
rectly or indirectly. Some bills focus directly on PAEs by allowing fee shifting 
to the prevailing party if the adverse party is a PAE.326 Other bills may not 
consider the party’s identity in the fee shifting analysis, but impose different 
requirements on PAEs. For example, the proposed Patent Litigation Integrity 
Act allows courts to impose bond posting only on the patentee and provides 
that whether the patentee is a PAE should be considered in the court’s bond 
posting decision.327 
The Court’s decision in Octane Fitness and the congressional bills aim to 
lower the standard for granting fee shifting in patent litigation.328 But, while 
the adopted and proposed changes are beneficial for end users, end users are 
still uniquely situated. The following discussion will focus on designing a fee 
shifting regime that will specifically address the unique characteristics of end 
users. This discussion has been largely absent from the current debate. 
2. Considerations in Designing a Fee Shifting Regime 
Regardless of the fee shifting regime selected, fee shifting will not moti-
vate all end users who have meritorious non-infringement claims to proceed to 
litigation. Neither will the availability of fee shifting ensure that end users will 
regularly seek the invalidation of patents through suits for declaratory judg-
ment. End users’ stakes are often small and they may rationally prefer not to 
engage in litigation. At the same time, the availability of fee shifting will en-
courage some end users to defend their meritorious claims and is likely to in-
crease the number of declaratory judgment suits for patent invalidity. Some 
end users do, in fact, have long-term interests. For example, patients of chronic 
or genetic diseases who rely on a specific drug would have an incentive to 
congregate and file a declaratory judgment suit.329 Fee shifting cannot by itself 
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place end users on equal footing with other patent litigation participants, but it 
can contribute to leveling the playfield. 
Fee shifting comes in different forms. It can be mandatory, discretionary, 
awarded to any prevailing party, or awarded only to a prevailing plaintiff or 
prevailing defendant. The type of fee shifting employed depends on the ra-
tionale, whether it is for fairness, equalizing power between the parties, a par-
ticular incentive, or a combination of several reasons.330 The following discus-
sion considers three factors affecting the design of fee shifting and their impact 
on end users. 
a. Prevailing Party or Defendant 
Fee shifting to address the needs of end users could apply to any prevail-
ing party or only to defendants (whether parties sued for alleged infringement 
or parties taking preemptive measures by suing for declaratory judgment to 
declare patent invalidity).331 Currently, Section 285 of the Patent Act provides 
for fee shifting to any prevailing party.332 Allowing fee shifting to any prevail-
ing party significantly enhances the risk that end users undertake if they pursue 
litigation because the court could find the end user liable for the patent owner’s 
expenses as well as its own. End users are already risk averse due to their une-
qual litigation position and often prefer to settle or not pursue meritorious 
claims. A prevailing-party fee shifting regime further decreases the likelihood 
that end users will pursue litigation. 
Limiting fee shifting to defendants, however, could prejudice small inven-
tors trying to enforce their patent rights.333 Small inventors have lesser means. 
And although the availability of PTO proceedings and contingent representa-
tion gives small inventors additional tools that end users cannot avail them-
selves of, pro-defendant fee shifting may have a chilling effect on small inven-
tors. These inventors may be less likely to enforce their patents if failure to win 
could make them liable for the opposing party’s costs. Concerns regarding the 
economic incentives for small inventors weigh against a pro-defendant fee 
shifting regime.  
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b. Mandatory or Discretionary 
Fee shifting can be either mandatory or discretionary. Currently, Section 
285 of the Patent Act provides for a discretionary fee shifting regime.334 A 
mandatory fee shifting regime under which the court must grant fees to the 
prevailing party can increase certainty for end users in a pro-defendant shifting 
regime. Under a mandatory pro-defendant fee shifting regime an end user has a 
guarantee that should it prevail, its expenses will be compensated. But, be-
cause a pro-defendant regime fails to protect small inventors, it is necessary to 
evaluate the effects of a mandatory regime that can compensate any prevailing 
party.  
A regime, in which an end user will be held liable for any prevailing pa-
tentee’s litigation fees, involves great risk for an end user. The outcome of pa-
tent litigation is highly uncertain and is particularly unpredictable for end users 
who lack the technological expertise to evaluate the patent’s validity and pa-
tentee’s infringement arguments at the outset. A discretionary regime, on the 
other hand, enables a more granular investigation of the circumstances of the 
lawsuit and can consider the end user’s status. Although the end user will not 
have the guarantee of a mandatory regime if she prevails, neither will she incur 
the risk of mandatory fee shifting to the patentee. Furthermore, a discretionary 
inquiry that accounts for end users’ unique characteristics could encourage end 
users to pursue their claims in court. 
c. General Application or Special Status 
A fee shifting regime can expressly identify certain parties and accord 
them special status. Currently, Section 285 of the Patent Act does not grant any 
party special status. At the same time, several bills identify PAEs for special 
treatment in fee shifting decisions.335 Defining PAEs, however, has proven to 
be difficult. There are competing interpretations of what entities are the PAEs 
that abuse the patent system, hinder innovation, and therefore warrant special 
legal treatment.336  
Identifying the end user as a party that warrants preferential treatment in 
the context of fee shifting is an alternative that could carry several advantages. 
First, the express mention of the end user in the legal framework for fee shift-
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ing would carry a message that could reduce the end user’s perception of risk 
in pursuing litigation.337 Many end users receive cease and desist letters and 
select to settle because they do not want to incur litigation costs. The availabil-
ity of fee shifting may affect the calculus of at least some of these end users. 
Second, a fee shifting regime that focuses only on exposing PAEs to an in-
creased likelihood of paying for the opposing party’s fees, fails to capture the 
full spectrum of end user cases. While some end user cases are indeed the re-
sult of PAEs’ action, others are not. Patentees, such as Myriad or Monsanto, 
who were involved in recent end user litigation, would not be considered PAEs 
under any definition.  
This Article defined the end user as an entity who is not in the business of 
making or selling the accused technology. It is not a technology company that 
directly competes with the patentee. Instead, the end user utilizes the technolo-
gy in its business or personal life. End user’s use of the technology in business 
can include incorporating the accused technology as a component of a product. 
The end user is distinguished from the technological competitor in that he 
lacks the technological expertise regarding the technology, since he is not in 
the business of making and selling the technology itself. 
There are two options for incorporating end user status into the fee shift-
ing analysis. End user status could mandate fee shifting if the end user pre-
vails, or it could be a factor that weighs toward fee shifting. Incorporating end 
user status as a factor may be the more appropriate option because it retains the 
necessary flexibility for borderline cases. Defining who is an end user is likely 
to encounter some of the same challenges encountered in defining PAEs. 
Moreover, some end users may be particularly innovative and change the de-
sign of a patented product, making them look more like technological competi-
tors.338 Hinging fee shifting completely on the status of the end user may be 
hard to apply in certain cases. Furthermore, using the end user status as a fac-
tor in fee shifting analysis could retain the expressive advantages of fee shift-
                                                                                                                           
 337 See Bernstein, supra note 53, at 287 (discussing the expressive powers of the law); McAdams, 
supra note 53, at 397–400 (same). For further discussion of the expressive powers of the law, see 
generally Anderson & Pildes, supra note 53; Smith, supra note 53. 
 338 See ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 70−72 (2005) (describing the innova-
tive user); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951, 
954 (2004) (“[C]opyright’s former consumers are now the creators, producers, and disseminators of 
content.”). See generally William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2010) (discussing legal conflicts between user innovators and producers); Kath-
erine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 
(2008) (distinguishing the user innovator from the prevailing conception of the seller innovator in 
patent law and focusing on research tools inventions); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux 
and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (describing peer production projects that many 
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ing—sending a message to end users that litigation may carry reduced risk for 
them—while allowing courts to retain some discretion. 
3. Application: The Many Shades of End Users 
This proposal advocates retaining some of the current framework of the 
patent system’s fee shifting regime.339 Specifically, it supports allowing any 
prevailing party, whether patentee or defendant, to be eligible for fee shifting. 
It also advocates retaining the discretionary nature of fee shifting. It does, 
however, propose to include end user status as a factor that weighs in favor of 
fee shifting when an end user is the prevailing party. The Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Octane Fitness to lower Section 285’s “extraordinary circumstances 
standard,” for alleged infringers benefits end users. Some of the legislative 
proposals would have a similar benefit for end users. But, the incorporation of 
end user status as a factor that weighs in favor of fee shifting, whether legisla-
tively or judicially, would be particularly effective in sending a clear signal to 
end users that pursuing litigation is a legitimate option. 
Although this Article defines end users broadly and lumps many types of 
end users together in order to highlight the breadth of the transformation in 
patent law practice, it proposes a granular investigation of the specific end user 
party during the fee shifting determination. Courts deciding whether to grant 
fee shifting to a prevailing party that qualifies as an end user can consider the 
characteristics of the specific user. Even prevailing end users can differ signifi-
cantly from each other and a court can assess whether the specific user in ques-
tion displays the classic characteristic of an end user. The following discussion 
highlights some prototypical end user examples and illustrates how they can 
affect the fee shifting result. 
One example is the case of the user-innovator. Although most end users 
are not technologically sophisticated, a minority may be. Some end users are, 
in fact, innovators. These end users have a sophisticated understanding of the 
technology and often create improvements of patented devices or processes.340 
These user-innovators may look less like the typical end user in that they have 
a technologically sophisticated understanding of the patented device and may 
also be early adopters who are aware of the technology earlier in the life of the 
patent. Some of these user-innovators may want to sell their improved innova-
tion in which case they will begin looking even more like competitors. Where 
a user-innovator is a party in the litigation the power inequality between the 
                                                                                                                           
 339 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (providing the patent system’s current fee shifting standard). 
 340 See generally VON HIPPEL, supra note 338 (discussing users who are innovators); Fisher, 
supra note 338 (same); Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 338 (same); Strandburg, supra note 338 
(same). 
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user and the patentee can be significantly reduced and, therefore, the argument 
for fee shifting would be weaker. 
Another example involves users who incorporate a patented technology in-
to a central function of their business. These users may not know as much about 
the technology as the manufacturer, but they may still have significant techno-
logical sophistication regarding the technology. For example, imagine that a pa-
tentee sued Starbucks for using its patented coffee machine in all Starbucks’ 
cafes. Unlike wireless technology that is not central to Starbucks business, a cof-
fee machine is. Although Starbucks is not the manufacturer or seller, it may have 
significant technological knowledge regarding the operation of these patented 
coffee machines. The user that possesses technological sophistication because a 
patented device is central to its business may not resemble a competitor as much 
as the user-innovator, but still may share fewer of the classical characteristics of 
the end user. In this situation the inequality between parties may also be reduced 
and the case for fee shifting would be weaker. 
Finally, some end users represent a public interest or a broader private in-
terest in a declaratory judgment action. For example, the patients and physi-
cians suing Myriad sought broader access to breast cancer genetic testing.341 
Invalidation of Myriad’s patent benefitted not only those who were parties to 
the litigation but also many others seeking more affordable breast cancer ge-
netic tests, the ability to receive a second opinion, or to test for additional mu-
tations.342 Where end users file for declaratory judgment to invalidate a patent 
that affects a broader interest, the private attorney general justification weighs 
strongly toward fee shifting. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article set out to reveal a new phenomenon in patent litigation. It 
highlighted the growing role played by end users both at the center and in the 
shadows of patent litigation. The Article showed that end users have become 
litigants in some of the major patent cases before the Supreme Court and Fed-
eral Circuit. They are also plaintiffs suing to challenge pay-for-delay agree-
ments between manufacturers of patented drugs and generic drug manufactur-
ers. At the same time, PAEs are suing or threatening to sue thousands of end 
users for use of their allegedly patented technologies. 
The Article defined end users broadly to include those using a patented 
technology for personal consumption or in business. End users, however, do 
not make or sell the technology directly. It emphasized that while the equities 
                                                                                                                           
 341 See Complaint, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, supra note 6, at 3–13. 
 342 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2111 (invalidating certain breast cancer gene 
patent claims). 
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of end user cases may differ, all end users suffer from the same procedural dis-
advantages because they are uniquely situated compared to other players in the 
patent arena. End users differ from small technological competitors because 
they lack an intricate understanding of the patented technology, they tend to 
become involved in the patent conflict relatively late in the life of the patent, 
and they are typically one-time participants in the patent system. 
The Article demonstrated that the AIA, which aimed to catch up with the 
changing patent landscape, failed to predict and is largely ill-equipped to ad-
dress the growing role of end users. One set of AIA reforms set up and refur-
bished PTO procedures to provide an efficient and less expensive forum than 
litigation to resolve patent disputes. End users, however, are unlikely to benefit 
from these procedures, primarily because they usually become involved in pa-
tent conflicts after most of these procedures are no longer available. Another 
AIA reform—the prior user rights defense—is also unlikely to benefit end us-
ers because they typically do not use the technology a year before the filing of 
the patent application, which is a requirement of the defense. 
Although Congress and the Supreme Court have debated and assessed fee 
shifting in patent litigation, the Court’s decisions and congressional debates 
ignore the special needs of end users. To account for the needs of end users, 
this Article proposed maintaining patent law’s current fee shifting framework, 
while including the status of the end user as a special factor that would weigh 
toward granting fee shifting when the end user is a prevailing party. 
